

ecbi Annual Report

2018-2019



Deo Saran. Felipe De Leon. Kishan Kumarsingh. Simon Cardy
José Miguez. Guo Xiaofeng. Carlos Fuller. Orlando Rey. Manjeet Dhakal. Ajay Raghava. Maesela Kekana
Emmanuel Dlamini. Kaveh Guilanpour. Mohanakumar Rahul. Gebru Endalew. Luiz de Andrade Filho. Tshewang Dorji
Selamawit Desta. Juliana Arciniegas Rojas. Rueanna Haynes. Benito Müller. Stella Gama. Irene Suarez. Achala Abeyasinghe

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MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR



A key strength of the ecbi has been the identification of potential roadblocks in the global climate negotiations, and efforts (often successful) to engage negotiators from across the spectrum to identify innovative ways to break the impasse.

In 2018-2019, as the global negotiations on the Paris rulebook approached the endgame, we identified two such critical areas: common timeframes and Article 6 market mechanisms. These two issues, along with the continuing concerns regarding the adequacy and predictability of climate finance, formed the focus of our work during the previous year. Senior negotiators on these issues were engaged in contributing to publications either as co-authors or reviewers, followed by discussions during the Bonn and Oxford Seminars. Although these issues proved too difficult to resolve at Katowice, our efforts to build bridges will continue this year, with the active participation of the negotiators working to resolve these issues under the UNFCCC.

ecbi also took steps to strengthen our focus on gender and climate change, launching a formal collaboration with the Women's Environment and Development Organisation. Meanwhile, the recently launched **Pocket Guide** series grew in number and popularity, and a new publication series was launched – an annual summary of outcomes from the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP), with comments and analysis from negotiators on each issue. The first of this series, *COP24 Outcomes*, was very well received, and it is likely to be valuable for new and senior negotiators alike.

The three Regional Training Workshops held this year in Africa and Asia continued to provide an opportunity for more seasoned developing country negotiators to mentor a new generation to represent the developing countries, particularly LDCs, and further level the playing field under the UNFCCC. Over 40% of the newly trained negotiators are women – a critical first step towards correcting the gender balance among UNFCCC negotiators. While the Regional Training Workshops focused on building negotiating skills and broad familiarity with the key themes of the negotiations, the Pre-COP Workshop was more focused on orienting new negotiators to the process and providing them with a road map to negotiate the two weeks of formal negotiations, including through an introduction to the agendas and presentations on key areas of interest for developing countries during the Conference.

As 2018-2019 was the penultimate year of Phase IV of the Initiative, an **independent evaluation** took place, and highlighted the continued relevance of the ecbi. The evaluation described the Initiative as unique in the negotiation process – no other actors provide a similar service which combines several elements of training, relationship building, and provision of information. It also found that the Initiative is currently meeting

and often surpassing its agreed outcomes, while producing unplanned benefits, including networking for participants, informal support to unblock negotiations challenges, and sharing of information with participants' colleagues. The enablers include the informal setting of activities, and the reputation of the programme, particularly in terms of its unbiased approach.

As work begins on designing the next phase of ecbi, we look forward to increasingly shifting the focus of our work from the UNFCCC arena, towards a dialogue between global policy and national implementation. In response to the evaluation, we hope to widen our work to translate global policy for national and sub-national actors on one hand; and to bring back lessons from national implementation to inform global policy-making on the other. Some work in this direction has already taken place in previous years – through our work on enabling sub-national access to global climate finance, for instance, and through national implementation dialogues during Regional Training Workshops. As the global focus shifts towards national implementation, we hope to strengthen this aspect of our work not only through the efforts of our international partners (OCP, IIED, and LRI), but also through greater participation of regional partners, such as ENDA in Senegal and Janathakshan in Sri Lanka. We hope that this will not only strengthen national implementation, but also make global policy making more responsive to challenges on the ground.

Benito Müller

Director, ecbi
Oxford, May 2019

ECBI ACTIVITIES IN 2018-2019

The Fellowship Programme

In addition to the annual Bonn Seminar and Oxford Fellowship and Seminar this year, the Fellowship Programme organised five events on: Funding Climate Justice – Advancing Sub-National Action on Multilateral Climate Finance; Innovative Sources for Multilateral Climate Finance; Highlights from Katowice (a Webinar); From Katowice to Florence – The outcomes of COP24 and the role of non-state actors; and Capacity Building at the Intersection of Women’s Leadership and Gender Equality.

2018 Bonn Seminar

The 2018 Bonn Seminar, on 6 May at the Oxford Club in Bonn, was attended by 45 participants from Europe and developing countries. They discussed issues of relevance to the development of the Paris Agreement Work Programme, including Article 6 market approaches under the Paris Agreement; common time frames; ambition and the Talanoa Dialogue; and predictability of climate finance.

Article 6: Market Approaches under the Paris Agreement

This session was initiated with a presentation by Müller, who based the presentation on the second part of an [ecbi policy brief](#), presenting a conceptual analysis of the Paris Agreement market approaches. (The first part of the policy brief presents a history of the Article 6 negotiations from the perspective of Europe and Brazil).

Müller introduced basic concepts related to Article 6 mechanisms used in the policy brief, including:

- ‘Originating Party’ (or ‘originator’), covering both ‘creating’ or ‘issuing’ Party;
- ‘Transferring Party’ (transferring out);
- ‘Acquiring Party’ (transferring in); and
- ‘Using Party’, or ‘user’.

He noted that the defining feature of Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) is that they can be used by an acquiring Party towards achieving its nationally determined contribution (NDC). In that context, NDCs have been associated with a “scope” (identifying what the NDC “covers”), and “quantifications” (either of the NDC as a whole, or of components).

A ‘quantification’, in this context, is given by the specification of:

- a ‘quantitative scope’ (a measurable, extensive quantity variable associated with the NDC), together with
- a ‘target level’ (the level of this quantity variable that needs to be reached for the NDC to be achieved).

Müller then introduced the concept of a ‘**final tally**’, defining it as the actual (measured) level of the respective quantity that determines, by its relative position to the associated target level, whether an NDC has been achieved, with respect to the quantitative scope in question.

He noted that the policy brief differentiates between the micro and macro level: the former relates to activities and the latter to parameters that emerge from collective outcome of these activities. Macro-level concepts are essentially those pertaining to the ‘quantitative scope’ of NDCs with regard to ITMO usage in achieving them,

such as ‘target level’ and the final level (‘tally’) used to determine whether the target has been achieved or not. This final tally is determined by ‘micro-level’ activities in ways that are not always directly attributable.

Using examples from the Kyoto Protocol trading mechanisms to elaborate these definitions, Müller said while international Emissions Trading is at the macro-level, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) function at the micro-level. The micro-macro distinction used in his analysis is therefore about whether the parameter in question is identified through a particular activity, or with reference solely to the quantified NDC. Noting that usage of ITMOs towards NDC achievement would take place at the macro level, he said the ultimate usage of an ITMO is a macro-level activity.

Müller then presented an example of using an ITMO towards achieving an NDC. In a target-based approach, he noted, the transferred mitigation outcome (MO) is *added* to the user NDC target level. In a tally-based approach, the transferred MO amount is instead *removed* from the final tally of the user NDC. He said that under a target-based approach, as the transferred amount is used to increase the user NDC target-level, a corresponding adjustment in the form of a reduction the originator’s target-level is necessary to ensure environmental integrity.

In a tally-based approach, given that an acquiring Party uses an ITMO by removing the amount from its final tally, the emissions thus removed need to be “reallocated” to the final tally of the originating Party, to ensure there is no double counting.

Müller then presented a fictional case of an Article 6.2 transfer of a 10-unit MO from the Kingdom of Rohan to the Kingdom of Gondor, in the fictional world of Middle Earth created by Professor J.R.R. Tolkien as the stage for *The Hobbit* and *Lord of the Rings*.

The status quo ante (the situation before the transfer and usage of the 10 ITMOs) is described in Table 1.a, he said. As both Kingdoms have a target below their baseline, final tally levels below the targets thus reflect genuine MOs.

In his fictional case, Müller, said, Rohan’s final tally is 10 units below its target, while Gondor has overshot its target by the same amount, and thus will not be able to achieve its NDC without acquiring 10 ITMOs to cover the gap. Neither Kingdom has transferred or acquired ITMOs at that point in time, as reflected in the relevant ‘ITMO registry entries’.

At the time of transfer, the ITMO registry of Rohan is debited with 10 units and that of Gondor credited with the same amount, thus leaving them with –10 and +10 units respectively. As discussed above, Gondor has the choice of using the credited ITMOs in two different ways:

- changing its target level by adding 10 units, (‘target-based use’); or
- changing its final tally by subtracting them (‘tally-based use’).

In either case, Müller noted, the change has the effect of Gondor achieving its NDC, and Gondor’s 10 credits are cancelled from the ITMO registry (indicated by the bracket notation). However, in order to safeguard the environmental integrity of the regime, Rohan is meant to undertake some compensatory changes in the respective levels (i.e. target or final tally) of its own NDC, which in turn leads to the cancellation of Rohan’s 10-unit debit in the ITMO registry.

Müller said a target- or tally-based use by the acquiring Party (Gondor) has to go hand-in-hand with a target- or tally-based compensating adjustment by the originating Party (Rohan). Mixing the two will either lead to an

infringement of the target integrity or an apparent improvement of aggregate ambition due to leakage (of the emissions subtracted from Gondor's final tally).

While this approach is easy for activities within an originator's NDC, he elaborated, it is more complicated for activities that fall outside of an originator's NDC, and a fierce debate is underway on whether or not there should be corresponding adjustments for activities outside an originator's NDC. While this cannot be resolved in a target-based interpretation of ITMO usage, a tally-based approach presents a compromise between these positions. If the activity generating the MO falls within an originator's NDC, a simple corresponding adjustment takes place. For activities that fall outside a user's NDC, however, it does not result in a corresponding adjustment in the originator's NDC. Instead, Müller proposed a buffer registry which reflects the emissions that were removed from a final user tally, so as to not lose count of them.

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed, among other things, the implications of trading on NDCs; the implications of maintaining a buffer register; the consequences of generating credits not covered under NDCs; and the implications of carbon offsetting schemes under bodies such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA).

Common Time Frames: What & Why?

This session was also initiated with a presentation by Benito Müller. Müller noted that at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) to the UNFCCC in Paris in 2015, it was agreed that the Conference of Parties serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) "shall consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its first session" [Article 4.10]. In Marrakech, the year after, the CMA agreed to refer the matter to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).

SBI47, in 2017, "*invited Parties and observers to submit, by 31 March 2018, their views on common time frames for NDCs ... including on, but not limited to, the usefulness of and options for common time frames and the advantages and disadvantages of those options, for consideration at SBI 48 (April–May 2018)*".

In response, Oxford Climate Policy (OCP) made a **submission** to the UNFCCC, based on the work done in collaboration with several other authors over more than two years.

Presenting the proposal in the OCP submission, Müller differentiated between "period of implementation" and "target period", with the latter referring to a continuous time period used in defining the NDC target level. He suggested that the period of implementation can be seen to begin with the communication, and its end cannot be later than the end of the target period. However, the two should not be confused. In particular, policies requiring 10-year periods of implementation can be based on, say, five-year target periods.

Müller further noted that the Paris Agreement requires Parties to "*communicate an NDC every five years in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21*" (Article 4.9), which itself stipulates (§25) that NDCs are to be submitted "*at least 9 to 12 months in advance of the relevant session of the [CMA]*." However, neither the Agreement nor the Decision says anything as to when this cycle is meant to start.

Both paragraphs §23 and §24 refer to time frames, he said, in the sense of periods of implementation. Yet the paragraphs are really about timetables for communicating and updating. Each of the two paragraphs defines an NDC communication and/or updating timetable pertaining to Parties that are identified by reference to the length of their initial period of implementation. The 'common time frame' question in this context, therefore is about *the usefulness of, and options for, combining the two timetables and the advantages and disadvantages of those options*, to paraphrase the SBI 47 conclusion.

Müller then described an example of a §24 country with an NDC with a ten-year period of implementation. He noted that this country will have communicated a 2030 INDC. In 2020, it can choose to either fix this as its NDC, or update it, thus providing a 10-year planning horizon.

In 2025, this country will have the option to “communicate or update” its NDC. It can either choose to communicate a 2040 NDC or update the concurrent (2030) one. Assuming the latter option of a mid-term update is chosen, the country will have a short-term (five year) planning horizon.

In 2030, the country will have to communicate a new NDC. But since the current one is ending in 2030, and nothing further reaching has previously been communicated, this will be a cliff-hanger situation, with the planning horizon reduced to one year.

Müller also stressed that although the country has chosen the §24 option with ten-year periods of implementation, it will have to communicate something every five years.

He then described the dynamic contribution cycle proposed by participants in the 2014 ecbi Oxford Seminar, according to which all Parties would, in 2025, be requested to update their 2030 NDC and communicate an indicative 2025 NDC, and continue to do so every five years.

Müller said this option will help ensure that all countries feel the pressure to update and improve their NDCs; provide them with a longer-term ambition horizon; and allow countries to gauge the ambition of other Parties, to help them in setting the level of their own ambition. He highlighted the importance of countries knowing the intention of their peers and competitors in advance, to justify a higher level of ambition in their own NDC, to national stakeholders.

He highlighted the indicative NDC as an important enabler for encouraging ambition by Parties, without the fear of being either a free-rider or taking on an unfair burden. Without an idea of the ambition of other Parties, he said, countries are unlikely to stick their necks out and take on higher ambition levels. He said communicating NDCs every five years will also ensure that technological advances are taken into account in communicating or updating NDCs.

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed the benefits of shorter time frames in allowing reflection on whether new technologies and changing circumstances can allow for greater ambition; the role of indicative goals in the “plus five” proposal; and alignment with longer-term low carbon development strategies and national strategies.

Ambition and the Talanoa Dialogue

This session was initiated with a presentation by Achala Abeysinghe, Head of the ecbi Training and Support Programme, based on an ecbi [Policy Brief](#). Abeysinghe noted that the process is designed to help countries to take stock of efforts to reduce carbon emissions and to uncover ideas, innovations, and technologies that can help them to raise ambition in their NDCs.

She said paragraph 20 of Decision 1/CP.21 provides the mandate for the Talanoa Dialogue, with additional references in paragraph 16, 1/CP.22 and paragraph 10, 1/CP.23. The Dialogue is a process, which started in January 2018 and will convene throughout 2018, and will present an opportunity to reflect on the adequacy of currently submitted NDCs against the goals of the Paris Agreement and inform the preparation of new or revised NDCs to be presented by 2020. She noted that current NDC ambition leads to 3.2°C by 2100, so enhancing the level of ambition of current NDCs is crucial.

The Talanoa Dialogue provides new mode of engagement for different voices to be heard, she said, and it recognises the growing involvement of non-Party actors in the UNFCCC process and in climate change action.

It also provides an opportunity to identify: untapped mitigation possibilities; good policy and best practice; and solution-oriented examples to strengthen ambition in climate action. The Talanoa process is expected to be inclusive, participatory, and devoid of finger pointing, aimed at making decisions for the collective good.

Abeysinghe said the Dialogue will include a preparatory phase, including national, regional or global events in support of the process, and inputs from all stakeholders. At the current session, an opening meeting took place on 2 May, a discussion was taking place on 6 May, and a report back session will take place on 8 May, with a closing on 9 May. The preparatory phase will continue through the year and conclude with a political phase at COP24 in December 2018, with the engagement of leaders and heads of state.

Summarising the inputs into the Dialogue so far, she said the Talanoa Dialogue Platform received 220 inputs as of 2 April 2018, which were included in a synthesis note ahead of the Bonn Session. Most of the inputs were received from non-Party stakeholders. She said the secretariat summarised the responses based on the three questions of Dialogue: where we are; where we want to go; and how do we get there.

On the question “where we are”, inputs ranged from information on greenhouse gases (GHGs); climate impacts and vulnerability; initiatives and actions taken including strategies, plans, and policies; and means of implementation and support needs.

On the question “where we want to go”, inputs ranged from future visions towards zero net emissions and climate resilience (either for the specific constituency or globally); catalysing ambitious climate action and the achievement of poverty eradication and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); emissions trajectories; and visions for a functioning international regime to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

On the question “how do we get there”, inputs ranged from recommendations and calls to action for the secretariat, bodies of the Convention and national governments; sustainable high-potential solutions with socioeconomic and environmental benefits, including on technology and collaboration models (with sub-national inputs touching on collaboration models, human settlements, transport and energy); crosscutting actions (including finance, gender, health, education, less well-represented constituencies and decent work); and actions on the ground (such as national climate plans and strategies). The inputs also include recommendations for peers, the secretariat, and the bodies of the UNFCCC.

Abeysinghe said the IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C in October 2018 will be a critical input into the Dialogue and efforts to raise ambition, and it requires a formal space for consideration in advance of COP24. Additional input can be provided by stakeholders until 29 October 2018, and a synthesis report of the preparatory phase will be prepared to inform the political phase of the Dialogue.

The outcomes of the dialogue at COP24 should result in a clear political commitment to significantly reduce emissions when communicating NDCs by 2020, she said, to put the world on track for 1.5°C. To continue building political momentum for greater ambition after 2018, a plan should be in place by the end of COP24 for activities in the period up to the communication of new and updated NDCs by 2020.

Abeysinghe concluded with the following list of questions for participants to consider:

- How do we address lack of capacity of some countries to participate in the Talanoa Dialogue?

- What could the outcome look like? (COP decision or political declaration). How do we capture concrete lessons from the stories told that catalyse real action?
- How do we use the Talanoa Dialogue to ensure that there is enough support for where we need to be?
- How can we utilise other high-level events such as the Climate Summit and the UN Secretary-General's summit to take raise ambition?
- What can we learn and improve upon for the global stocktake?
- What should be the process between 2018 and 2020 and 2023?

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed how to enhance the long-term impact of the Dialogue, including through a COP decision; the role of the Dialogue in providing a space for more substantive conversations; and lessons for the global stocktake from the Dialogue.

Predictability of Climate Finance under the Paris Agreement

This session was initiated with a presentation by Orlando Rey Santos, Cuba, who focused on Article 9.5 and paragraph 53 of Decision 1/CP.21. It was chaired by Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu, Co-Chair of the ecbi Advisory Committee.

Santos noted that the predictability of climate finance is essential to allow for long-term planning and scenario-building at the national level; and for predictability of mitigation, well-organised cycles, and low carbon strategies at the global level, in the medium- and long-term. The provision of climate finance is also a matter of trust and confidence, and intrinsically linked to the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP) and the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

He noted that Article 9.5 calls on developed country Parties to “...*biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties*”. Other Parties providing resources are also encouraged to communicate such information biennially on a voluntary basis.

Paragraph 53 of Decision 1/CP.21, meanwhile, states that “... *prior to 2025 the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries*”.

With regard to the ex-ante communication referred to in Article 9.5, he said such information is essential to know ahead of time where financial flows are going and have a consistent aggregation around finance. As most developing country NDCs have conditional elements, the lack of ex-ante information on finance has an impact on the predictability of NDCs and the intention of enhancing ambition.

On the new collective goal to be agreed before 2025, he said this is essential to ensure the adequacy and predictability of climate finance. The new goal is to be set collectively as a result of a process that include a mechanism to take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. Article 2.1.c of the Paris Agreement explicitly states that finance flows have to be made consistent with the global climate goal. To limit mean temperature increases to “well below 2°C” while aspiring to keep it within the 1.5°C limit already means that the scale of finance needed will in fact be much higher. Declaring a new climate finance goal will not be enough – a clear roadmap is also essential, he said.

Santos said the extension of the US\$ 100 billion goal to 2025 was already a flexibility shown by developing countries in the Paris Agreement negotiations, that should be honoured with early engagement in the definition of the new goal. Given the experience with the previous goal, where it took several years to translate

a pledge into a roadmap, discussion should begin as soon as possible. He felt the reluctance to consider a proper framework for ex-ante information and to start discussing the new climate finance goal could be interpreted as a lack of commitment to climate finance by developed countries, and this could compromise agreement on a balanced outcome at COP24.

Santos also addressed the question of whether countries can predict their contributions in advance. Despite national budgetary limitations, he said, countries make multi-year commitments to international finance organisations such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), suggesting that it is possible to provide indicative information several years into the future, and it is at least possible to clarify contributions within defined replenishment cycles. Stating that high ambition in the Paris Agreement will not be possible without predictable finance and a realistic guarantee that this finance will be available, he noted that some options in this regard had been considered in a concept note published by OCP and ecbi, on *A Paris Replenishment Cycle for Contributions to the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism*.

Müller noted the uncertainty surrounding the US\$ 100 billion pledge made at Copenhagen, including whether it will be sourced from public or private finance. He said it will be difficult to agree on a metric to measure private sector sources contributions to climate finance, and such figures can be recipes for mutually assured unhappiness without agreement on metrics. He proposed separating the two, and only have a public-sector goal and mobilisation to take the inherent unhappiness out of the process. One way to get predictability, he said, could be to have a five-year replenishment process as proposed in the ecbi note referred to by Santos. He warned that unless something is done to address the root causes, the climate finance discussion will continue to breed mistrust.

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed the role of Article 9.5 in creating trust; limitations in providing projections of finance; the importance of predictability for developing countries to implement their NDCs; and the role of private sector sources, and of South-South flows.

A more detailed report of the 2018 Bonn Seminar is available [here](#).

2018 Oxford Fellowship and Seminar

The European Capacity Building Initiative's 2018 Oxford Seminar took place from 15-17 August, in the Examination Schools of the University of Oxford. It was attended by 26 participants from developing countries (including two who participated via video link in the ecbi Fellowship Colloquium held from 13-15 August 2018 in Merton College), and 16 participants from Europe.

The Seminar was attended by, among others: representatives of previous (France), current (Fiji), and incoming (Poland) Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); the Chair of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs); the Chairs of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA); the Co-Chair and members of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Board; the Co-Chair of the Paris Capacity Building Committee (PCCB); members of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF); the Co-Facilitator of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform; several heads of delegation; and issue leads from key negotiating groups.

Discussions took place on: Paris rulebook expectations for Katowice; gender and climate change; linkages between Articles of the Paris Agreement; predictability of climate finance under the Paris Agreement (Article 9.5); the enhanced transparency framework; the collective quantified goal for climate finance (Decision 1/CP.21, §53); Talanoa Dialogue; non-market cooperative approaches (Article 6.8); common time frames (Article 4.10); and climate change and human rights.

Paris Rulebook Expectations for Katowice

This session started with a **presentation** by Lavanya Rajamani, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi. Rajamani noted that a key expectation from Katowice is reaching agreement on the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP), and a series of overarching questions need to be addressed to deliver on this expectation. During the course of the discussion during the Colloquium, she noted, participants discussed some of these overarching questions, including: the structure of the overall package; the level of detail/precision in the rules; the extent of bindingness of particular rules; the application of differentiation in the rules; and the timing of adoption and application of the rules.

On the structure of the overall package, Rajamani said the Katowice outcome could take one of three possible forms:

- A **single comprehensive decision** of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), with different sections addressing various parts of the Paris Agreement, and Annexes on particular issues (the model followed by the Cancun Agreements).
- An **overarching decision tying together individual decisions** for each part of the Paris Agreement (the model followed by the Marrakesh Accords).
- **Separate decisions for individual issues** within broader provisions (for instance, separate decisions on the features, information, and accounting of Nationally Determined Contributions).

She noted that in theory, the content of the package could remain the same irrespective of the structure. In practice, however, the structure could affect the durability of the decisions and rules, and the dynamism that they reflect. For instance, a single comprehensive decision has the advantage of making it easier to address linkages between the decisions in a more coherent fashion. An overarching decision tying together individual decisions for each part of the Paris Agreement has the advantage of perhaps making it easier to tailor each part of the rulebook to the desired levels of prescriptiveness, bindingness, and differentiation. It could be useful to go down this route if some areas are not mature enough for adoption at Katowice, she noted, as they could be adopted later. This would also make it easier to update rules later, without re-opening all decisions.

Addressing the level of prescriptiveness of the outcome, she said that more prescriptive rules will offer greater certainty, predictability, and consistency in application and international discipline. Less prescriptive rules will be easier, and take less time, to negotiate and will not be seen as undercutting the nationally determined nature of the Paris Agreement. Describing the range of options, she listed:

- Detailed substantive rules.
- Minimum substantive rules, allowing parties to nationally determine any additional rules.
- Procedural rather than substantive rules (for instance, elaborating on national rules and implementation).
- A combination of these (for instance, prescribe minimum substantive and complementary procedural rules).

On the level of bindingness of the outcome, she said individual elements of the Paris rulebook could vary in legal character. However, the CMA can only adopt binding rules where the Paris Agreement authorises it to do so. Even where the CMA authorises binding rules, for instance by using “*shall*” in the context of Article 4.8, 4.9 and 4.13, parties could calibrate the bindingness of the rules that are within the decision. For instance, the Paris Agreement refers to 1/CP.21, but the paragraph in relation to information, §27, uses the language of “*may*”. So even though it is mandatory to apply that decision, the decision could contain various elements that allow discretion to parties.

Describing ways to calibrate the bindingness of rules, Rajamani said the CMA could choose to calibrate a rule's bindingness by:

- Making a rule legally binding, where authority exists (parties “*shall*”).
- Making a rule recommendatory (parties “*should*”).
- Identifying a rule but making it optional (parties “*may*”).
- Identifying a rule and generating expectations of parties (parties “*will*”).
- Using contextual and discretionary language (“*as appropriate*”, “*to the extent resources permit*”, etc.)

Rajamani said the outcome could include differentiation based on:

- The type of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), with different rules, for economy-wide targets and policy and measures.
- Differences between parties, either based on their categories (developed and developing countries, least developed countries (LDCs), small island developing states (SIDS) etc.), on measures of capacity such as GDP per capita, or other criteria such as percentage of global emissions.
- Support provided.
- Timing.
- Self-determination (“*to the extent possible*”, “*as appropriate*” etc.), where parties elect to choose how they apply the rules.

Addressing the linkages between prescriptiveness, bindingness, and differentiation, Rajamani said the more prescriptive the rules are, the less likely parties will agree to render them binding, and the greater the pressure some parties will exert for differentiation. The fine balance that will need to be struck between the three will need to be calibrated to each rule or set of rules, she said, and the big picture will need to be taken into account while crafting particular rules.

With regard to timing, she noted a distinction between when decisions and rules are adopted, and when they apply. She said the rules could be adopted at different times, providing a way out to address issues that prove harder to negotiate at this point of time. They could also be set to apply at different times (for instance, for different categories of parties or based on different NDCs); be synchronised to apply at the same time (such as information on transparency and accounting feeding into the global stocktake); apply at different times in relation to some rules (such as the NDCs) and synchronised to apply at the same time in relation to others (such as fairness and ambition); or apply at different times in relation to some rules, synchronised to apply at the same time in relation to some others, and left up to national determination in relation to the rest. She noted that a host of permutations and combinations on timing could help get out of sticky areas with regard to the rules.

Rajamani finally listed the following key questions for discussion at the Seminar, based on the discussion during the Colloquium:

- Within the context of the mandates, should there be a minimal or maximal approach to the rules in Katowice?
- Which rules, and at what level of prescriptiveness, are critical, and must be adopted at Katowice? This could be:
 - in relation to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement;
 - in relation to “gap filling” (ex-ante information, support, etc.) to make the Paris Agreement more robust; and/or
 - in relation to process, where processes are set up in Katowice to yield more substantive rules later on.

- Which rules can be left for subsequent evolution? Should this include rules on items where the discussion is not sufficiently mature, or where rules are not politically feasible, resulting in a focus on “common interest” issues only?
- Which rules, if overly prescriptive at this point in time, could exclude participation of certain key parties?

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed, among other things, what rules are critical for Katowice, and how to determine what is critical; whether a comprehensive set of rules is essential, or some elements can be built later on; rationalising the amount of work that can be done in Katowice; and the importance of focusing on content rather than process.

Gender and Climate Change

Introducing the session, Müller said a session on gender was only part of the Colloquium in the earlier years, of the ecbi Fellowships, but was shifted to the Seminar from 2017 because it was felt that a discussion on gender is relevant to all countries, not only developing countries.

Presenting on gender, Bridget Burns, Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), addressed: the definition of gender; what negotiators should know about gender; the current state of play on gender, in particular in the Lima Work Programme on gender and the Gender Action Plan (GAP); and gender in the Paris rulebook.

Burns defined gender as a lens for an analysis for social roles, saying it is not about women alone. She presented the definition for gender equality agreed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): “... *the equal enjoyment by women and men of socially valued goods, opportunities, resources, and rewards. The aim is not that women and men become the same, but that their opportunities and life chances become and remain equal*”. Burns said the consideration of gender through gender situational analyses and gender disaggregated data can lead to more effective climate change policies.

She then presented the following figures to illustrate how a gender lens and analysis could provide a contextualised and country/ region-specific knowledge base for effective policy making:

- 38% of the global population and almost 50% of the population in developing countries lacks access to clean energy. Women and children spend on average 1.4 hours a day collecting solid fuels.
- It is estimated that by 2050 there will be more plastics than fish in the oceans, and the risk for breast cancer for women working in the plastic industry will increase five times.
- Women own less than 20% of the world’s land, yet more than 400 million of them farm and produce the majority of the world’s food supply. Female farmers lack equal rights to own land in more than 90 countries.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, over 50% of users of public transportation systems are women. However, the participation of women in the construction and operation of transport systems does not exceed 15% of the total labour in the sector, even though they represent 50% of the labour force.

Burns then described the climate impacts that will exacerbate existing inequalities around the world, summarised in the Table below. She referred participants to the *ecbi Pocket Guide to Gender Equality under the UNFCCC* for a snapshot of several key moments and decisions under the UNFCCC; and to a **Gender Climate Tracker App** developed by WEDO to help negotiators to understand mandates.

Briefly describing starting points for gender mainstreaming at the national level, Burns listed the following questions:

- What are the key considerations for undertaking gender assessments? What kind of information will be required? The objective is to ensure that the different needs of women and men, and boys and girls are equitably addressed.
- What are national policies on gender? Is there a template for conducting a gender-situational analysis?

She highlighted that gender is not a stand-alone issue at the national or global level, and coherence and synergies are necessary with other areas. It is therefore critical for negotiators working in all areas of the UNFCCC negotiations to know how gender has been integrated previously in the areas of their focus. Burns summarised the following key decisions taken under the UNFCCC on gender:

- **COP7** in 2001: Decision 36/CP.7 & Gender in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)
- **COP16** in 2010: Gender in Cancun Agreements
- **COP17** in 2011: Gender in GCF Operational Guidelines
- **COP18** in 2012: Decision 23/CP.8
- **COP20** in 2014: Lima Work Programme on Gender (Decision 18/CP.20)
- **COP21** in 2015: Gender in Paris Agreement
- **COP22** in 2016: Decision 21/CP.22
- **COP23** in 2017: Gender Action Plan (2017-2019)

She noted that the three-year Lima Work Programme on Gender (renewed in Marrakesh) and the Gender Action Plan (GAP) will be reviewed in 2019, though there is no formal process or terms of reference for the review. The Lima Work Programme is focused on strengthening women's participation, she said, and contains specific elements like nominating gender focal points, gender trainings, and reporting from all the UNFCCC's constituted bodies on their work on integrating gender to encourage coherence. The GAP calls for a dialogue among the constituted bodies, which was held at the 48th session of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Bodies. Trainings of the constituted bodies will start in October 2018 until early 2019, on how to integrate gender

in reporting requirements and how to share information. In addition, she listed other processes in place, including to: understand how different parties are acting on the GAP; track progress on the gender focal points; conduct workshops on the collection and use of gender disaggregated data; and call for a dialogue in the SCF to improve access to finance for women.

Burns listed the following activities that are taking place under the GAP:

- Countries are supporting implementation via direct support for training and enhancing women's participation.
- Countries are transposing or linking their own national strategies on gender and climate change to the activities of the GAP (for instance, in Sudan).
- Countries are developing tools to integrate gender in NDCs.
- Countries are appointing national gender and climate change focal points and national taskforces.
- Organisations, local governments, etc. are creating their own self-assessments of the GAP (i.e. what activities are being implemented, or what activities they would like to see implemented).

She described a **Women Delegates Fund** managed by WEDO to support participants from LDCs and SIDS, and for regional trainings; and efforts to create and generate a knowledge base within the UNFCCC to inform other parts of the process.

Burns listed the countries that have appointed gender focal points, noting that the process creates a dialogue between ministries and sectors on where the focal point should be based, and how to integrate gender concerns. She noted that while there is no defined role for the focal points, potential roles could include:

- Awareness-raising and capacity-building within delegations and at the national level on gender and climate change.
- Point-of-contact within delegations for questions on thematic issues such as climate finance and gender.
- Coordination of the delegation's positions on gender within the gender and climate change agenda item and other thematic areas.
- Coordination at the national level for climate planning, for instance, between ministries on climate change and those dealing with gender, and to better connect the UNFCCC process to national processes.
- Participation in networking and capacity-building events organised by other entities in support of the UNFCCC process, such as WEDO, UN Women, IUCN etc.
- Point-of-contact for the secretariat (and others) to communicate about relevant events, information, training, etc.
- Raising awareness and tracking progress on gender-responsive climate plans and communication (NDCs, NAPs, national communications etc.).
- Tracking progress on delegations' goals on gender balance at UNFCCC and other meetings.
- Advocating for gender balance in nominations to constituted bodies and bureaux by countries or groups.

Burns then went on to describe the current state of play on gender in the negotiations for the Paris rulebook.

On **mitigation**, she noted that some parties list gender-related considerations under their substantive elements for information, and this is captured in the guidance from the Co-Chairs.

On the **adaptation communications**, the gender-responsive nature of all adaptation policies and planning has been vocalised by parties and is captured in the Co-Chairs' tool.

On modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) for **transparency**, the Co-Chair's tool includes elements on:

- principles of MPGs, calling for them to be flexible, country-driven, nationally determined, consistent with national circumstances, participatory, and gender responsive; and to consider vulnerable groups, communities, and ecosystems;
- adaptation policies and strategies, calling for them to include and be evaluated on how participation, best available science, gender perspective, as well as indigenous, traditional, and local knowledge are integrated into adaptation; and
- making the MPGs gender-responsive.

She further listed the following specific entry points for the transparency framework:

- Ensuring that any reference to stakeholder participation explicitly refers to women's participation and to participation of women's groups and organisations.
- Information on adaptation actions that result in mitigation co-benefits should refer to the role of women in adaptation actions, and be based on data disaggregated by sex, age, and other factors, and include gender analysis.
- Sustainable management of natural resources should refer to the role of women and analyse the impact on gender equality and women's empowerment.
- Information related to loss and damage should be provided using sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis.

- Assessments and indicators of how adaptation increased resilience and reduced impacts should use data disaggregated by sex, age, and other factors, and include gender analysis.
- Information on how support programmes are meeting specific vulnerability and adaptation needs and concerns should address the role, situation, needs, and rights of women and girls, and the impact of such programmes on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls.

Burns listed the following entry points for the consideration of gender elements in the **global stocktake**:

- During the preparatory phase, women’s organisations and national gender machineries could be included as sources of inputs.
- During the technical phase, explicitly reference should be made to the participation of women, and women’s groups and organisations.

UN Women has recommended the following sources of input for the global stocktake: information related to equitable access to sustainable development; historical responsibilities; development gaps between North and South; sustainable development including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), poverty eradication, food security, job creation, and social justice in developing countries; explicitly request information on climate refugees and displaced people to be disaggregated on the basis of sex, age, and other factors; address “leave no one behind” principles; and elaborate on how actions contribute to the realisation of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and on co-benefits, including gender equality and women’s empowerment.

In conclusion, Burns directed participants to view additional slides in her [presentation](#) for reference material.

During the discussion that followed, participants discussed the role of gender focal points; the lack of specific indicators to track gender in the context of climate change in the SDGs; gender as a non-issue for the environment ministries; the importance of mainstreaming of gender in country programming; gender as a core principle in development cooperation; challenges in implementation, even for developed countries; the importance of a gender equality goal for delegations; and gender as a binary issue in the gender a climate process, which has not yet matured to include LGBTQ communities.

Predictability of Climate Finance under the Paris Agreement (Article 9.5)

This session started with a [presentation](#) by Orlando Rey Santos, Cuba, followed by Müller. Santos noted comments by the UNFCCC Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa reported in the media, that finance is the lifeblood of the Convention, and that the conditional elements of the NDCs of developing countries will cost US\$ 4.3 trillion to be achieved. Remarking that this number is likely to be inaccurate, he said nevertheless predictability of finance is a critical element to implement the conditional elements of NDCs mentioned by Espinosa, and achieving the ambition of the Paris Agreement.

While acknowledging the role of domestic sources in implementing NDCs, he said it will be important to know how much finance will be available for implementing NDCs, and the lack of ex ante information on finance could impact the predictability of the NDCs and the intention of enhancing ambition. Article 2.1.(c) of the Paris Agreement explicitly states that finance flows have to be made consistent with the global climate goal, he further noted.

Santos said Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement emphasised the need for a robust system for finance by calling on developed country parties to biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information on climate finance, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources. Other

parties providing resources are also encouraged to communicate such information biennially, on a voluntary basis.

He said the discussion on the new collective goal for finance, called for in the Paris Agreement, is a matter of ensuring predictability and adequacy. This new goal is to be set collectively, following a process to assess the needs and priorities of developing countries. The ambition of the Paris Agreement, to limit global temperatures to well below 2°C and if possible to 1.5°C, means that the scale of finance needed will be much higher. Declaring a number alone will not be enough, he emphasised – a clear roadmap to achieve the goal will also be necessary.

Santos said the extension of the US\$ 100 billion goal to 2025 is already a flexibility from the developing countries in the Paris Agreement, which should be honoured with an early engagement in the definition of the new collective goal. Based on the experience with the previous goal which took several years to translate from a pledge in Cancun in 2010 to a roadmap in Marrakesh in 2016, he said discussions should begin on the new collective goal as soon as possible. A decision to start the conversation on this goal in Katowice is a way of generating goodwill, Santos, said, while noting that language calling for consideration of the technical work with regard to the goal to be undertaken is already in the Co-Chair's summary. Reluctance to consider a proper framework for ex ante information and to start the consideration of a new goal, on the other hand, could be interpreted as a lack of commitment to climate finance itself, he said, which could compromise a balanced outcome at COP24.

Santos further emphasised that predictability of finance includes certainty on timing, scale, reliability, and direction. He recognised the problems faced by developed countries in providing ex ante information, given legal constraints in national budgetary processes, but said a starting point could be to consider how much information is provided now, and what further improvements are possible in the future. He also noted that some of the national budgetary limitations have been overcome in the past, for instance in the case of multi-year commitments to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the GCF. This suggests that it is possible to provide indicative information several years into the future, he said, or at least to clarify contributions within defined replenishment cycles. He noted consideration of this issue in an ecbi [think piece](#).

Describing solutions to deal with the issue of predictability in the second half of the presentation, Müller agreed that predictability is a difficult topic. He said he would talk about predictability through a replenishment process for the climate funds, as countries can bind themselves if there is a contract with an entity. Other ways of enhancing predictability, for instance through innovative sources of finance, also exist.

He quoted a ecbi [brief](#): *In the final days of the Conference the LDC Group, supported by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), put forward the idea of a Paris Replenishment Cycle three times for inclusion in the Presidency's text, but to no avail. Initially, they asked for the establishment of such a joint replenishment cycle as complementing to the decision in the draft text that 'a significant share of new multilateral funding for climate change actions should flow through the Financial Mechanism of the Convention and the funds serving the Agreement' [para. 54 in draft decision V2] – which incidentally also did not make it into the final outcome. The last attempt, at 1 a.m. on Saturday morning, the LDCs' request was merely for a COP decision to consider the idea at COP 22 in Marrakesh, but that was also rejected.*

Müller said the idea of a joint replenishment for all the climate funds was introduced in October 2015, but negotiators were not ready for it in Paris. The GCF will have a replenishment process anyway, and adding to this amount for the other funds should not be difficult. He noted that the Adaptation Fund is in trouble currently because it does not have a replenishment process. Although a process is underway to consider its

accreditation to the GCF, it could also be replenished directly through this proposed joint replenishment process and specialise in funding micro adaptation projects.

Müller quoted Raffaele Mauro Petriccione, Deputy Director-General for Climate Action of the European Commission, at an informal meeting of the EU's Environment Council on 11 April 2018: *"The Commission would suggest that Member States should seriously consider the replenishment of the climate funds under the climate Convention, the Global Environment Facility, and the Green Climate Fund. Our position on this issue will be very important for the negotiating dynamics at COP24 and actions on these issues will have a positive impact which will be disproportionate to the relatively small funds that would be needed."*

Agreeing with Petriccione, Müller said this would be a solution to the problems of the Adaptation Fund and predictability, and allow the GCF to become a "wholesale" fund, allowing the smaller funds to become retail funds.

Müller concluded by describing another idea to promote predictability supported by ecbi: seeking contributions (shares of proceeds) from sub-national emissions trading schemes, like the Western Climate Initiative. He informed participants that ecbi is organising a side event at the Global Climate Summit in San Francisco on 14 September on sub-national finance, not only from sub-national emissions trading schemes, but also other sub-national sources such as a "people's fund" in the US, and income tax refunds in the state of Massachusetts.

Johanna Lissinger Peitz responded to the presentation, agreeing that predictability is an important issue, and the discussion under the SBI agenda has had a good start. However, she said, Article 9.5 is only one component of predictability – other action on the multilateral level, for instance with the multilateral development banks (MDBs), is also part of the solution. She said greater transparency on existing flows will also contribute to predictability, providing an indication of what has flowed in the past, and hence what can be expected in the future.

Peitz said other guiding questions include what is useful ex ante information, and what is feasible. She said duplication of reporting should be avoided, for instance reporting on development cooperation; and the process should build on existing structures and learn from what has been done on strategies and approaches, for example. She highlighted the importance of a flexible approach to reporting, given that different contributors will have different processes, abilities, and constraints. This issue relates to the discussion on prescriptiveness in the first session, she said, on how greater prescriptiveness could make it less acceptable to parties. She felt that the more things are divided into what is qualitative and what is quantitative, the less complete the picture will be. From her perspective, she said, the rules should not separate what should be reported on a quantitative and qualitative basis – this choice should be left to parties.

Peitz noted that Article 9.5 also talks about contributions from other countries on a voluntary basis as well, and it will be important to take into account South-South cooperation for a complete picture. She said progress on Article 9.5 can also help with providing information on making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, mentioned in Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement. She agreed that trust is important, saying the progress made in small settings such as the ecbi Seminar should be captured to promote trust in the UNFCCC process. She concluded with a question, saying that on the one hand she has heard that more information is needed for planning at the national level, while on the other hand it was mentioned that predictability was needed only on collective global trends. She asked if one was being discussed, or both. On Müller's intervention, she said elements that were not included in the Paris Agreement should not be raised now, although there are elements in the proposal that merit consideration.

Further discussions on this issue took place in a small group, which discussed: what kind of quantitative or qualitative information should be provided on finance; the need for collective and national-level information on support; enabling environments, and reciprocal predictability from the other side to do what is possible at the national level; the proposal for a replenishment cycle for the climate funds; and potential guidance on the role of each of the funds to create a more coherent financial mechanism, like the two-year framework of programme priorities given by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to the GEF.

Linkages Between Articles of the Paris Agreement

This session started with a **presentation** by Manjeet Dhakal, based on a draft ecbi policy brief by Ian Fry and Dhakal, exploring the links between major elements of the Paris Agreement and identifying missing links.

Dhakal noted the Paris Agreement is a complex set of linking elements, with the linkages varying based on their nature and context. Such linkages could be direct, inferred, conceptual, institutional, or at a group level. Noting that he would explore only some of the linkages in more detail in his presentation, Dhakal listed the following **direct linkages**:

- NDCs
- Market and non-market mechanisms
- Adaptation action and communication
- Finance
- Technology development and transfer
- Capacity building
- Transparency framework
- Global stocktake
- Compliance mechanism

He listed the following **conceptual linkages**:

- Temperature goal
- Gender equality
- Common but differentiated responsibilities & respective capabilities
- Human rights
- Integrity of all ecosystems

The following **inferred linkages** were listed:

- Sinks and reservoirs, including forests
- Loss and damage
- The following **institutional linkages** were highlighted:
 - UNFCCC
 - Kyoto Protocol
 - UN institutions and specialised agencies, such as UN agencies working on displacement mentioned in Article 8.
 - IPCC

Collective group linkages include:

- Developing country parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable
- LDCs and SIDS
- Local communities and Indigenous Peoples

Dhakal pointed to the conceptual link of the temperature goal in the first instance, saying it is a point of reference for the entire Agreement, and a clear pivotal point for the development of NDCs and the need to reach a global peaking of greenhouse gases. He said the goal creates a basis for the Talanoa Dialogue for the reconsideration of NDCs prior to 2020, and is a reference point for the adaptation goal established in Article 7. Moreover, Article 14 on the global stocktake states that its purpose is to take stock of the implementation of the Agreement and to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the Agreement and its long-term goals.

Moving on to discuss the direct linkage of the NDCs, he said Article 4 focuses on mitigation efforts linked with the global temperature goal. He noted ambiguity on what is meant by NDCs, and on whether an absolute emission reduction target includes removals, though there are no explicit linkages to forests (Article 5). He said the NDCs explain the roles of developed and developing countries; and include a complicated concept relating to mitigation co-benefits resulting from adaptation actions.

On market and non-market mechanisms in Article 6, Dhakal noted clear links between two institutional arrangements in Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 and to mitigation outcomes within NDCs; while he said the framework for non-market approaches (Article 6.8) makes reference to mitigation and adaptation ambition, and to enhanced public and private sector participation in the implementation of NDCs. However, despite these links, there is no reference to Article 6 institutional arrangements in the transparency framework, although the indirect linkage to NDCs could be said to create this link.

Dhakal said Article 13 on transparency is the most connected Article and relates to reporting and reviewing. There are links to: the overall goal in Article 2; clarity and tracking of NDCs and adaptation actions; clarity on support provided and received in relation to Articles 4 (NDCs), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (technology) and 11 (capacity building); information to track progress of NDCs; information on climate change impacts and adaptation; MPGs for transparency of action and support; “transparency-related capacity” of developing country parties; and information for the global stocktake. In addition, there are direct and indirect links to institutional arrangements in other Articles of the Agreement, including the technical expert review (TER) and facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress (FMCP).

He then described links within Article 4, 6, and 13 that need to be further clarified, listing:

- How to ensure “double counting” is avoided on the basis of a corresponding adjustment by parties for both anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks covered by their NDCs?
- How to ensure accounting guidance facilitates clarity and transparency of tracking progress made by individual countries in implementing and achieving NDCs, taking into account provisions in Article 4 and 13, including review of information related to Article 6 activities?
- How to sequence the timing of 4 NDCs submitted as ex-ante information, with Article 13 tracking of progress, and countries engaging in implementing Article 6 provisions? How will the accounting balance be covered?

On adaptation action and communications, he noted links between adaptation and mitigation through the concept that more mitigation action will make less adaptation necessary. The global adaptation goal is linked to the overall goal of the Agreement, and there is an option for adaptation communications to be incorporated with an NDC, although there is no reference to how frequently the adaptation communication will be communicated if they are not part of the NDCs. In addition, links to finance, technology transfer, and capacity building are defined within the context of “*continuous and enhanced international support*”. There is a continuation of existing obligations for developed countries under the Convention to provide financial resources (Article 9.1), and the transparency framework and global stocktake are back referenced. The

transparency framework, while not referred to directly in Article 7, back references to adaptation actions under Article 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps, which then is intended to inform the global stocktake. It also back references adaptation actions with respect to providing clarity on support provided and received. What is not linked, however, is how backward-looking information on adaptation reporting relates with the adaptation communications (forward looking); and how it relates to the transparency framework and inputs to the global stocktake. The transparency framework also requires reporting on impacts and adaptation. This tends to imply that adaptation communications should have both a backward-looking and forward-looking component.

On finance, Dhakal said the overall goal of the Agreement is obliquely referred to in the finance Article. While there are processes to review support provided and mobilised (Article 9.7) and information on support needed and received (Article 13.10), he said, there doesn't appear to be a process whereby these two sets of information can be matched up. The information on support needed and received is not part of the technical expert review (TER), so it is not clear how these two will be linked. He noted a disjointed reference to developed country parties being required to biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information relating to support in Article 9.5; and a direct reference to other sections of the Agreement, stipulated with respect to the need for the global stocktake to take into account the relevant information by developed country parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance. Finally, the overall goal of the Agreement is obliquely referred to in the finance chapter with respect to a "global effort" by developed country parties to take the lead in mobilising climate finance.

Dhakal summarised the following gaps in linkages related to climate finance:

- How the information provided on support provided and mobilised by developed countries (Article 9.7) is linked/matched up to information on support needed and received by developing countries (Article 13.10)?
- How to manage the disjointed reference to the provision for developed country parties to biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information relating to support (Article 9.5)?
- How should the finance-related information processed under the transparency framework feed into global stocktake (Article 14)?

Moving on to linkages related to loss and damage, Dhakal said Article 8 was agreed during the final hours in Paris, and therefore there was no time left to develop linkages with other elements of the Agreement. However, there are linkages in other Articles – for instance, the reference to action and support with respect to loss and damage in Article 8.3 creates an inferred link with other Articles. There is overlapping language in both Article 7 and Article 8 referring to "early warning systems". He asked how the provisions of Article 8 can be operationalised, building on linkages with the global stocktake (Article 14) and the transparency framework (Article 13).

Finally, Dhakal discussed the global stocktake, saying it is a collective assessment of the whole Agreement. While Article 14 on the stocktake does not make specific linkages to other Articles of the Agreement, there are back references and many links revolve around the stocktake. For instance:

- NDCs are to be communicated every five years and these need to be informed by the outcomes of the global stocktake.
- The global stocktake is required to recognise adaptation efforts of developing country parties and enhance the implementation of adaptation action.

The global stocktake has to take into account relevant information provided by developed country parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance. The link between the global stocktake and Agreement bodies includes all the institutions established under the Convention and subsequently linked to the Agreement. This is evidenced by the wording calling on parties to “*take stock of the implementation of this Agreement to assess collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals...*”.

In conclusion, Dhakal said many of the linkages in the Paris Agreement revolve around the transparency framework, which then feeds into the global stocktake, to serve as a means of encouraging and cajoling more concrete action. Proposing ways to address the interlinkages, he said:

- The overall structure of the COP24 outcome could be an opportunity to address interlinkages without losing sight of elements that are directly linked (for instance, through a single comprehensive decision or overarching decision discussed earlier).
- Linkages can be taken as an opportunity to bring together various elements and have a centralised discussion, which can then feedback to respective elements. For instance, a joint session on agenda items 4 and 5 of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) took place in the previous session.
- Parties could agree to advance discussions in one place for elements that have multiple linkages, with an understanding to appropriately place the outcome of the discussion. This could also help to use available time efficiently. For instance, modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised is being discussed by SBSTA and under APA agenda item 5. It has been proposed that the item could be discussed in SBSTA, and the outcome fed into the APA discussion.

Dhakal concluded by saying that linkages should not delay decision-making, but serve as catalyst for progress.

Providing a response, Ana Cristina da Silva Carreiras said first and foremost, the mandate of the Paris Agreement should be followed. She felt linkages can be addressed through consistency checks by parties themselves, facilitators, presiding officers, COP presidencies and the secretariat. She emphasised the need to avoid procedural debates on how to address the linkages, while noting that a workshop on interlinkages is already planned on 3 September in Bangkok, although it is likely that will be high-level discussion that will not go into every detail. Urging pragmatism, she said substantive linkages are being dealt with in the rooms, and further discussion or contact groups are not needed. She acknowledged some procedural linkages that need to be discussed further, for instance between transparency and Article 15 on compliance, and between adaptation and transparency. There is no clear decision on whether adaptation communications should be part of NDCs, she said. If countries decide to include them in NDCs as a voluntary choice, then they should report on the basis of what they presented – this is country-specific and cannot be dealt with through a single formula. She urged using opportunities like the September workshop, communicating better with presiding officers, and moving forward while avoiding complexity and procedural debates.

During a small group discussion chaired by ecbi Co-Chair Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu, participants discussed specific areas where linkages could be essential, and practical ways to address them.

Transparency

This session started with a [presentation](#) by Tshewang Dorji, also on behalf of Xian Gao.

Dorji presented an overview of transparency. He noted that the mandate for negotiation, in §91 of the Paris outcome, requests the APA to “*develop recommendations for modalities, procedures and guidelines*”, and to “*define the year of their first and subsequent review and update, as appropriate, at regular intervals*” for consideration by COP24, with a view to forwarding them to CMA1 for consideration and adoption.

He said the transparency framework under the Paris outcome has two different sets of requirements for developed and developing countries. Developing countries have a different starting point, and flexibility to work towards the ideal transparency framework. One way to operationalise this flexibility and reduce the burden for developing countries would be to allow developing countries to report on the basis of their capacity, and to submit the biennial update reports (BURs) and national communications in conjunction. For developed countries, the technical expert review (TER) process could be conducted at the same time.

Dorji highlighted three questions with regard to operationalising flexibility for developing country: what elements of the framework are flexible, and what type of flexibility is offered; who can take advantage of flexibility; and when (for how long the flexibility should apply). He noted that these three elements will need to be balanced.

He also called on participants to consider how to “*build on*” existing requirements for measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, as called for in the Paris Agreement. In this context, he listed the following specific questions:

- What does “build on” mean?
- What are the existing bifurcated MRV arrangements?
- Do those rationales for bifurcation still stand in the post-2020 era?
- Is it necessary to continue with a bifurcated system under the transparency framework?

Finally, he called on participants to consider the timing for reporting to begin under the Paris Agreement, and the sunset clause for previous MRV arrangements written into §98 of Decision 1/CP.21.

Providing a response, Carreiras said the Paris Agreement agrees a common set of guidelines applicable to all parties, and although flexibilities are offered for developing countries, it is in the interest of all parties to eventually move towards common guidelines. She noted that it was agreed that parties will keep at least their existing level of reporting, but some parties that have the capacity should do more. The flexibilities will come in on an element-by-element basis, she said, and as stated in the Paris outcome, they will be based on scope, frequency, and level of detail. It will be up to an individual party, in the first instance, to determine if it needs flexibility, based on its capacities. If a party seeks flexibility, it should be able to describe why this was not possible. The information will go through a TER, she said, which is itself a capacity building exercise, as the technical team can help the party to determine its capacity needs. Gradually, the efforts of parties will progress towards convergence to standard report in the long term. The system will continuously improve itself, while taking into account the capacities of parties. At the same time, she concluded, it will be important to consider the capacity building needs of parties, and how they can be addressed to reduce the need for flexibility over time.

In a small group discussion chaired by Mpanu-Mpanu, participants discussed the option of all countries aspiring to achieve the “gold standard”, but with some flexibility for those who lack the capacity to build it over time, without any fixed annexes or lists for differentiation.

Collective Quantified Goal for Climate Finance

This session started with a **presentation** by Müller. He said in §53 of Decision 1/CP.21 it was decided that: “...in accordance with Article 9.3, developed countries intend to continue their existing collective mobilization goal through 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation; prior to 2025 the CMA shall set a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries”.

However, he felt that a vague collective quantified goal, without agreement on what it will include, is a recipe for “mutually assured unhappiness”.

To illustrate his point, Müller presented the history of the goal to provide US\$ 100 billion annually by 2020. He said Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State, is often credited with having introduced the US\$ 100 billion figure during the negotiations in Copenhagen, on 17 December 2009, announcing that *“this funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance”*. However, Müller said, the origin of the US\$ 100 billion figure was a speech by former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown in London Zoo on 26 June 2009, on the roadmap to Copenhagen. Brown proposed a new international partnership on public finance for climate change governed by four principles: equity of contribution and allocation; additionality; predictability; and shared governance.

Müller said Brown defined equity of contribution and allocation in the following terms in his speech:

- Leading developing countries *“can also make a contribution to the actions taken by the least developed”*.
- *Finance for adaptation should go to the poorest and most vulnerable countries, while monies for mitigation should go to countries on the basis of cost-effective emissions reductions.* He defined additionality as referring to a ceiling on ODA: *“In the UK we will limit such expenditure to up to 10% of our official development assistance. And we will work towards this limit being agreed internationally.”*

Brown defined shared governance in the following terms:

- *“We must move from a project focus to one which helps developing countries transform their economies and societies as a whole.”*
- *“Critically, such institutional reform needs to shift the balance of power in current governance structures. Developing countries need a stronger voice. And we need a country-led approach where finance is delivered in support of nationally-determined plans.”*

Predictability was defined in the following terms:

- *“Tackling climate change requires long-term investment, whether in mitigation or adaptation. Developing countries need to be able to plan and implement their low carbon and climate resilient development programmes in the knowledge that there will be finance for them. That requires predictable and adequate long-term financial flows.”*
- *“So the British government would be willing to support an international mechanism for the setting aside and auctioning of a small percentage of national emissions allowances, as Norway has proposed. Where countries do not feel able to participate in such a scheme, we would want to see comparable domestic legislation to provide predictable and adequate finance.”*
- *“And I believe we should also explore other potential means of raising finance internationally. For example, it is important that aviation and maritime emissions are brought into the Copenhagen agreement, and the mechanisms for reducing emissions in these sectors could also potentially yield revenues for climate financing.”*

Müller said Brown believed the mechanisms he set out, based on a combination of the carbon market, new and additional sources of predictable finance and a limited amount of development aid, were capable of raising at least the US\$ 100 billion, and this was a credible number against which countries to develop their plans. Müller then analysed how Brown came up with the US\$ 100 billion figure.

He said the Norwegian proposal called for withholding and auctioning, at the international level, a small portion from national quota allocations. According to Müller’s calculations, 2% of the 1990 Annex 1 emissions,

at the 2008 carbon price could yield US\$ 14 billion. 2% of 2020 Annex I emissions, at 30% of the carbon price of US\$ 100/tonne, could yield US\$ 23.2 billion.

Moving on to other “*new and additional sources of predictable finance*”, Müller considered the International Air Passenger Adaptation Levy (IAPAL) proposed by LDCs in 2008, and the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS) proposed around the same time. He said on an average levy of €/€ 5 per ticket, the IAPAL would generate around €/€ 10 billion per annum. A 2% levy, assuming an average ticket price of €/€ 200/500, would generate €/€ 7.6/19 billion annually. IMERS was estimated to generate US\$ 4 billion per annum.

Based on figures from OECD-DAC, “*a limited amount of development aid*” or around 10% of the US\$114 billion ODA in 2008, would generate US\$ 11 billion.

Adding these figures, Müller arrived at a total of US\$ 36 billion. Along with the US\$ 41 billion estimated to flow through bilateral and other sources in 2013-2014, he said, the total could have come close to the US\$ 100 billion promised, without counting private sector contributions.

Müller then proposed that in future, any collective quantified goal should focus only on what can be measured. He noted challenges in defining which parts of private sector finance should count as climate finance, in particular, but also public-sector loan elements. To avoid a situation in the future where a collective goal is agreed without a clear metric on how to measure progress, he said these uncertain elements should not be counted toward the goal.

Providing a response, Peitz said the informal discussion was helpful in understanding that a discussion on the goal was not being proposed as part of the PAWP outcome, but as an enabler in the process. She said it is important to think of the goal in the context the global effort, and in general terms any discussion on the future needs to be in the context of capacities and involvement of non-traditional donors and contributors. She further said that the goal needs to be seen in the context of transformational financial flows; and the more information is available, the more relevant the discussion can be. She noted that the discussion gives rise to issue of principles on a number of issues including channels, scale, process, contributors, and sources, among others. She referred to the Petersburg Climate Dialogue in May 2017, saying the messages from the Dialogue represented consensus from many ministers, including on private finance. She said a priority is to ensure access, including by improving the governance of MDBs, and the discussion on the quantified goal will be an opportunity to look at, and change, the bigger picture.

In the group discussion that followed, participants discussed, among other things, the need for a public sector “sub-target”; lessons from other multilateral agreements; and the need to define what it means to “mobilise” private sector funding.

Talanoa Dialogue

This session started with a **presentation** by Achala Abeyasinghe, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), focused on COP24 outputs from the Talanoa Dialogue, and links to the global stocktake.

Abeyasinghe noted that this important element of the Paris Agreement’s ambition mechanism aims to take stock of collective efforts towards the long-term goal in Article 4.1 and inform new/updated NDCs. The Dialogue is an important precursor to the global stocktakes, she said, and can be reasonably expected to inform future global stocktakes, although its main focus is on mitigation while future global stocktakes will have a broader focus. The form and content of the outcomes of the Dialogue will be critical in providing guidance and

precedent to the global stocktakes. Given the bottom-up nature of NDCs, Abeysinghe said the outcomes of the Dialogue are critically important.

Describing the Talanoa Dialogue process, she noted the three questions that the Dialogue is aimed to address: where are we now; where do we need to be; and how do we get there. The preparatory phase of the Dialogue, which is taking place through 2018 until the political phase begins at COP24, includes:

- submissions by parties and non-party stakeholders;
- a dialogue during the May 2018 session of the Subsidiary Bodies, including a summary by the COP Presidency.
- the IPCC 1.5°C special report, due in October 2018;
- a Technical Examination Process; and
- local, national, regional and global discussions.

She said a synthesis report of the preparatory phase will be produced by the Presidencies of COP23 and 24, to serve as the main input for the political phase.

Describing the Talanoa Dialogue sessions during the meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies in May 2018 in Bonn, Abeysinghe said almost 500 stories were narrated by participants, in addition to 220 written inputs provided online. She summarised the inputs, saying in response to the question of “where we are”, participants noted that carbon dioxide levels have surpassed 400 ppm. In the current scenario, global average temperatures will rise by 3-3.2°C by 2100, and climate impacts are already intensifying, particularly for most vulnerable communities. On a more positive note, she said, progress is visible on renewable technologies, and actions are increasing on the sub-national level.

On the question of “where do we want to go”, the outcomes confirmed the 1.5°C temperature goal and emphasised pre-2020 action, Abeysinghe said. Stories painted a vision for moving in solidarity towards a sustainable and prosperous future.

On “how do we get there”, Abeysinghe said contributors to the Dialogue call for: urgently increasing the scale and pace of climate action and support; greater cooperation, particularly financial, between countries and between stakeholders within countries; and more action and ambition, right now.

Abeysinghe said an important next step for preparatory phase will be full consideration of the IPCC 1.5°C special report, and reflections on the final outcome. The political phase will take place at COP24, with ministers, and will include roundtables to ensure a more focused and interactive discussion. The COP23 and 24 Presidencies will provide a summary of the key messages resulting from the roundtables. The Dialogue will take place at the beginning of the high-level event at COP24 and will allow parties to consider ways to reflect the main topics of the high-level discussions in the final outcomes.

Abeysinghe said the discussion will have to be very focused at COP24, considering the limited time available. The Dialogue could reflect on:

- The main challenges and opportunities to address the mitigation gap and associated impacts related to the under-achievement of the 2/1.5oC goal under the Paris Agreement.
- The role of long-term low emission and resilient development strategies (LERDS) in the context of achieving the long term goals under the Paris Agreement.
- Guidance necessary for countries to create favourable domestic legislative and policy frameworks to facilitate LERDS.

- Mobilisation and provision of means of implementation to unlock the mitigation potential identified by developing country Parties in the conditional component of communicated NDCs.
- Effectively integrating this potential into the updating of NDCs by 2020.

Abeyasinghe then addressed the form of the Talanoa Dialogue's outcome, listing a political declaration and COP decision as possibilities, and saying the guidance provided to the national-level preparation of NDCs by the outcome of the Dialogue will be critical.

Supporting a COP decision in addition to a political declaration, Abeyasinghe said the Dialogue is a good opportunity to address and to take stock of the collective efforts of parties towards the achievement of Article 4.1 at a high-level. A COP decision would:

- ensure the Dialogue produces a clear mandate for implementation for national policy makers;
- provide certainty and rigour to a year-long process involving parties;
- signal continuity beyond COP24;
- provide concrete guidance on next steps in preparing NDCs and enhancing ambition;
- provide responsibility and accountability that may not be achievable through a political declaration alone; and
- deliver a strong political message to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change.

Abeyasinghe listed the following possible elements for a COP decision:

- Welcome the completion of the mandate contained in §20 of Decision 1/CP.21 to “*take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Agreement and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Agreement*”.
- Welcome the IPCC special report on 1.5oC.
- Reaffirm the need to fulfil the request in §23 and §24 to communicate/update, by 2020, current/new NDCs; and the invitation in §35, in accordance with Article 4.19, to formulate mid-century, long-term low greenhouse gas emissions development strategies, taking into account common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.
- Underline the importance of such participatory dialogues with non-state actors, including the private sector.
- Reaffirm that the Paris Agreement is a balanced instrument that needs all its provisions to be implemented in order to be successful. From this perspective, mitigation action needs to be accompanied by an adequate implementation of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 as well as take into consideration the current needs for adaptation of parties, which need to be in balance with mitigation.

The decision could also call for operational guidelines to be developed, based on the high-level discussions.

Finally, Abeyasinghe listed the following points for discussion:

- The mandate of the global stocktake is broader than that of the Talanoa Dialogue, but there are lessons to be learned for future stocktakes from the Dialogue process.
- The Dialogue plays an important role in informing the NDCs, long term strategies ,and the submission of those by 2020.
- A ministerial declaration which can inform an operational decision will be useful.
- Talanoa outcomes will not create any new obligations.

Representing the Fijian COP23 Presidency which played a key role in the Talanoa Dialogue process, Ambassador Deo Saran said the submissions made after the May session will be processed, and a synthesis report prepared. He said the Presidencies are keen to get a brief on the substance and form of the final outcome of the Dialogue, saying it should be linked to the NDCs to ensure that there is an impact beyond simply sharing experiences.

Providing a response, Archie Young said the Dialogue in Bonn was inspiring and riveting, and he would like ministers to come away from COP24 with the same buzz. He hoped the Dialogue would hold potential lessons for the global stocktake, including how to engage ministers and make sure they listen. Young said the Dialogue is crucial to the credibility of Paris – if the ratchet mechanism doesn't work the first time, then it won't give credibility for the cycles to come. While the form of the outcome needs consideration, he felt what comes afterwards is even more important, as even a brilliant Dialogue process could result in not raising ambition and providing political momentum. Given that higher ambition will have to come from all levels, he said all actors will need to continue to be involved in some way in the outcome that follows. He ended with a quote from the EU Talanoa Dialogue: *A meaningful political outcome of the Talanoa discussions – and the only logical response – is a commitment by all governments to reflect on their domestic efforts and level of ambition in light of both (i) the Talanoa and (ii) the findings of the IPCC special report on 1.5 degrees. Future policy work, including the mid-century strategies due by 2020, should factor in the latest scientific evidence and the knowledge of the available solutions.*

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed the proposed text for a draft decision; whether there would be all-round support for a COP decision, and time to negotiate it; and creating a process to create peer pressure for parties to raise ambition.

Common Time Frames


The session started with a **presentation** by Müller focussing on how a synchronisation of certain procedural time frames ('common time tables') can enhance the overall ambition of the regime defined in the Paris Agreement. He noted that the topic has been discussed often in previous ecbi seminars, because it is an important issue for negotiators as they are actually in the driving seat when it comes to defining the process. It is therefore up to them to design it to ensure maximum ambition is squeezed out of the Paris Agreement.

Müller said initial submissions by parties indicate the lack of a common understanding on the meaning of "time frames" in this debate. Some parties use the phrase to refer to timetables for submitting/communicating NDCs, while others view it as periods of implementation or target periods.

While the communication frequency of NDCs is specified in Article 4.9 as once every five years, Müller said, NDCs can involve different target and implementation periods. He illustrated this through **Figure 1**, saying an NDC with a 10-year period of implementation (POI) can have a ten-year, five-year, or even a one-year target period (all ending at the same time as the POI). Moreover, he highlighted that POIs can overlap: implementation of an NDC can begin even if the previous NDC is not yet fully implemented (although overlapping *target* periods are not ideal from an Article 6 stand point).


Turning from these "material" interpretations of time frames as periods of time to the 'procedural' interpretation of time frames as NDC communicating/updating timetables, he recalled that §23 of Decision 1/CP.21 calls on parties with a time frame up to 2025 to communicate a new NDC by 2020, and do so every five years thereafter. Meanwhile, §24 calls on parties with an INDC time frame up to 2030 to either *communicate* or *update*, by 2020, these contributions and to do so every five years thereafter.

Figure 1



While these paragraphs refer to time frames as time periods, their operative content is procedural, Müller said: they specify what two different types of parties periodically have to do, but fail to specify a common timetable, even for parties with the same time frame. He presented **Figure 2** to illustrate how two different ways in which a §24-party can operationalise that paragraph.

Figure 2. §24 Communication & Updating Cycles



Under the **mid-term updating model**, Müller said, the 2030 INDC is re-communicated as an (indicative) 2030 NDC, and subsequently (in 2025) updated and fixed. In 2030, the cycle begins again with the communication of an (indicative) 2040 NDC. The advantage of this model, he said, is that every other period (2020-2025, 2030-2035, ...) it allows for a “synchronised ambition updating space” – five years where the intentions for the subsequent five years are publicly known, with an understanding that at the end of the five years, an updating is meant to be considered. The drawback is that every other period (2025-2030, 2035-2040, ...) there will be a “cliff-edge” situation, where the planning horizon (or what is known about parties’ intentions) will diminish to almost nothing. Müller pointed out that this is not helpful for domestic stakeholders or the international community.

Presenting the **up-front updating model**, he said the 2030 INDC is updated “up-front” before being communicated in 2020 (as fixed). In 2025, a new (indicative) 2040 NDC is communicated, and the cycle starts again in 2030 with an up-front updating of this indicative 2040 NDC. From the point of view of enhancing ambition, Müller said, this operationalisation of §24 is superior to the ‘mid-term updating’ model because it manages to avoid cliff-edge situations, while still allowing for synchronised ambition updates every alternate period.

However, Müller said there is room for even more improvement in terms of squeezing ambition out of the system, by creating a cycle of communicating and updating NDCs in a way that creates a synchronised ambition updating spaces every five years. He presented this as the “**Dynamic Contribution Cycle**” (DCC) developed during the 2014 ecbi Colloquium and Seminar.

Illustrating the DCC through **Figure 3**, Müller said all parties would update their (indicated) 2030 NDCs in 2025, and at the same time present an indicative 2035 NDC. This indicative NDC can be updated, if the country wishes, before it is communicated finally in 2030. In the intervening five years (2025-2030), parties and non-party stakeholders have the opportunity to evaluate the overall picture, and consider if their own indicative NDC for the 2030-2035 period is adequate and fair. In this context, Müller noted that while fairness and justice are not prescribed, consideration of these elements will help countries to justify greater ambition to domestic constituencies. Moreover, the option to update NDCs every five years will enable them to take into account new technological developments, and opportunities for collaboration, that could enable greater ambition.

Müller summarised the DCC as a way to establish a common (5-year) cyclical timetable providing sufficient time for all stakeholders to analyse indicated ambition levels, and for parties to consider updating them at the same time, while avoiding cliff-edge situations.


To operationalise the DCC, Müller proposed the following paragraphs for a decision:

Urges those Parties whose INDC contains a time frame up to 2025 to **communicate by 2020 an indicative 2030 NDC**.

Invites **all Parties in 2025 to update their 2030 NDC, and communicate an indicative 2035 NDC**, and to do so every five years thereafter.

Finally, Müller noted that the DCC has gained traction not only among thinktanks such as the [World Resources Institute](#) and [Oxford Climate Policy](#), but also in formal party submissions such as the one [submitted by](#)

Figure 3. The Dynamic Contribution Cycle



Ethiopia on behalf of the LDC Group, and supported by AILAC and Belize and Trinidad and Tobago in formal submissions.

Providing a response, Marianne Karlsen said the substantive issue in the contact group discussions under the UNFCCC is what facilitates ambition. The Paris Agreement already anchors a five-year ambition cycle, which all parties have signed up for. However, targets put forward prior to the Agreement reflect that many parties have considered different timeframes to be most conducive for national ambition. For example, 78 parties have a ten-year target. As a result, although the five-year cycle has been agreed internationally, there are still countries that are following ten-year (or other) timeframes domestically.

Karlsen noted that the Paris Agreement calls on all parties to prepare, communicate, and **maintain** an NDC for as long as they are part of the Agreement, communicate it every five years, and enhance ambition each time. §23 and §24 aim to synchronise communication and reporting. The fact that parties have different timeframes for their current NDCs does not change their obligations under the Agreement.

Karlsen said a concern is that if parties have a longer timeframe than the Paris Agreement cycle, it will be difficult to make changes mid-way, and some parties are concerned that this will lock in low ambition for a longer period. On the other hand, some parties have also argued that some policies need a longer time to implement – for instance, carbon taxes or transformative policies in the transport sector. Karlsen said while quick fix emissions reduction in transport could be carried out by increasing the mix of biofuels in existing vehicles, the transformation towards non-fossil transport will require a far longer time horizon, considering the infrastructure requirements and replacement rate of vehicles.

One of the key concerns brought forward in the debate about common time frames, Karlsen said, is that different time frames may create an imbalance: parties with a five-year horizon will have the pressure of communicating every five years following a global stocktake, while those with a ten-year horizon will not feel the same pressure. In addition, technical challenges may also arise from different timeframes related to comparability, accounting and corresponding adjustments, and environmental integrity. Parties may report at the same time, she said, but this is not the same as accounting, which will be done at the end of the target year. Hence the timing of accounting will not be synchronised if parties have different timeframes. This poses challenges and may not be good for the global stocktake.

Considering the suggestions on the table to overcome these difficulties, she noted that one possibility is to move to a common time frame, for which there are three options on the table: five years; five plus five years; and five plus five dynamic. Other options include keeping the time frame flexible, or having different domestic timeframes co-existing with a common international five-year timeframe to comply with the Paris Agreement. The latter option raises the issue of how the five-year international rhythm will be synchronised with domestic institutional cycles. Karlsen noted that while parties have different views on best to solve common timeframes, there is agreement among many on the timing of applicability, although this has not been put down on paper yet, and also there is a general agreement on the importance of §23 and §24.

During the discussion, participants discussed the four options that have been put forward in party submissions; the need for more regular updates on the basis of most recent scientific trends and technologies; the need to avoid asymmetries in the process where some parties feel under more pressure than others; and whether long-term strategies can provide enough information to avoid a “cliff-edge”.

Article 6.8

This session started with a [presentation](#) by Kishan Kumarsingh.

Kumarsingh reminded participants that Article 6 focuses on voluntary, bottom-up cooperation in implementing the NDCs to allow for higher ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions, and to promote sustainable development and environmental integrity.

Within this broader context of Article 6, he said, Article 6.8 specifically refers to non-market approaches. The intent is to pursue voluntary cooperative approaches/action among parties. The Article calls for integrated, holistic and balanced non-market approaches available to parties to assist in the implementation of their NDCs in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, in a coordinated and effective manner, including through, *inter alia*, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, and capacity building, as appropriate.

These approaches shall aim to: promote mitigation and adaptation ambition; enhance public and private sector participation in the implementation of NDCs; and enable opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant institutional arrangements. Article 6.8 calls for the establishment of a framework to achieve the aims.

However, Kumarsingh said, non-market approaches in themselves are not well understood, and called for a discussion to seek clarity. He noted that the Article makes no reference to a “governance or supervising body” as it does for Article 6.4, and it is not clear if institutional arrangements should lie within or outside the Convention.

The Article does not prescribe any approaches he said, asking if the approaches could include policies and measures as an example, and whether the focus is on creating synergy and coordination among thematic areas.

Kumarsingh noted that Decision 1/CP.21 requests SBSTA to undertake a work programme under the framework for non-market approaches, and recommend a draft decision on this work programme at the CMA's first session.

In light of the ambiguity and nebulosity surrounding Article 6.8, Kumarsingh proposed the following questions for discussion:

- Should the approaches include domestic policies and measures, or information exchange, for instance on best practices and demonstration projects/ programmes?
- How can such approaches be facilitated? Should they be top-down or bottom up, negotiated between parties?
- Can Article 6.8 facilitate significant domestic action to facilitate ambition and promote more ambitious NDCs?
- What can the framework be constituted of?
- What is the value added of this Article? How can such approaches help parties implement NDCs, bring out transformational change?
- Would a programme be useful under SBSTA to clarify some of the questions?
- What can be useful elements of a draft decision?

Providing a response, Outi Honkatukia agreed that there is very little understanding of non-market approaches, but despite that parties agreed to frame a work programme. She noted that it is easier to say what the work programme will not be: it will not look like market mechanism; and should not involve the creation and transfer of mitigation outcomes. She noted that most of the activities under the UNFCCC fit this description, and this could perhaps be a space to map current efforts and improve further opportunities. Key questions, however, were how this should be done and by whom.

In the ensuing discussion, participants discussed: the added value of non-market approaches, including for implementing initiatives similar to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS; the possibility of a longer term work programme; and the need to focus on the bare minimum that needs to be done in Katowice, as time is scarce.

Incorporating Human Rights in Climate Action

This session started with a **presentation** by Sébastien Duyck, Center for International Environmental Law, on the opportunities to address linkages to human rights at COP24.

Addressing the importance of human rights in climate policies, Duyck said public participation and collective design of climate policies can ensure that the policies are more effective and strengthened by local support. Calling for the empowerment of men and women to contribute to climate action, he said climate education enables children to act as agents of change and to fully understand ongoing and future impacts of climate change.

Duyck said considering the right to development and social and economic rights is key to a just transition and to leaving “no one behind” through the decarbonisation of the economy. Through a human rights lens, governments can guarantee that adaptation policies contribute to promoting and fulfilling the right to livelihood, food, access to water, and housing.

Addressing climate-related displacement through right-based frameworks and placing people at the core of disaster risk reduction, he said, contributes to more effective adaptation. Recognising and protecting the forest and land rights of indigenous peoples and local communities helps prevent deforestation; and establishing adequate social and environmental safeguards guarantees that projects implemented in the name of climate action benefits local communities and contribute to sustainable development. In this context, Duyck pointed to research focusing on the relationship between land tenure and forest rights for indigenous peoples and local communities in 14 forests-rich countries. It was found that:

- When Indigenous Peoples and local communities have no or weak legal rights, their forests tend to be vulnerable to deforestation and thus become the source of carbon dioxide emissions.
- Legal forest rights for communities and government protection of their rights tend to lower carbon dioxide emissions and deforestation.
- Indigenous Peoples and local communities with legal forest rights maintain or improve their forests' carbon storage.

Duyck then described the following links between human rights and ambitious climate action:

- Ambition and equity are required to guarantee the ability of all states to protect the rights of their people.
- Land tenure rights are key to carbon sequestration.
- Public participation and traditional knowledge strengthens design of policies.
- Empowerment of communities increases engagement and support.

He said 49 countries have made explicit references to human rights in their National Communications and National Adaptation Programmes of Action. Of these references, 13% referred to substantive rights (1% from developed and 12% from developing countries); and 20% of the references were to procedural rights (10% developed and 10% developing). 24 countries referred to human rights in their INDC.

Duyck listed the following references to human rights under the UNFCCC:

- In 2010, the Cancun Agreements called on parties to respect human rights in all climate-related action and introduced REDD+ safeguards.
- In 2015, the Paris Agreement called on parties to respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights when taking action to address climate change.
- In 2016, human rights were referred to in the mandate for the PCCB, and the Gender Action Plan was agreed.
- 2017 saw the operationalisation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

He said the implementation guidelines for the Paris Agreement, to be adopted in 2018, could establish “virtuous learning cycles” to safeguard human rights if:

- Parties are asked to include information on participatory processes and the integration of human rights in planning for NDCs.
- The transparency framework allows parties to share information of national experiences related to human rights aspects of climate policies.
- The global stocktake conducts a collective assessment of progress and lessons learned related to the incorporation of human rights in climate action.

Duyck also emphasised the need to ensure that the Article 6 mechanisms have adequate safeguards in place, to guarantee their social integrity. Incorporating these human rights considerations in the implementation of the Paris Agreement would, he said:

- Strengthen effectiveness of climate action and empower communities to contribute to policies.
- Promote policy coherence and synergies between climate action and the promotion.
- Enhance public support for climate policies.

He emphasised that the inclusion of human rights would not: create new obligations beyond those already provided in the human rights framework; impose human rights frameworks that States have chosen not to recognise them; or lead to any comprehensive review by UNFCCC bodies of human rights compliance.

Finally, he called for support for implementation beyond Katowice, in particular for:

- the PCCB;
- strengthening the institutional capacity of the UNFCCC secretariat so that it can support parties' implementation; and
- synergies with existing workstreams, including the GAP, Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture, Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform, and Warsaw International Mechanism.

In the discussion that followed, participants discussed the relevance of a human rights approach to REDD+ activities and the trading mechanisms; how the Warsaw International Mechanism could address human rights; what compromise should be struck when high ambition in an NDC clashes with human rights; whether references to human rights should be overarching or specific to each section in the rulebook; and challenges, including the lack of capacity, and public participation to ensure that people support ambition.

A more detailed report of the 2018 Oxford Fellowship and Seminar is available [here](#).

Funding Climate Justice: Advancing Sub-National Action on Multilateral Climate Finance

This Global Climate Action Summit Affiliate Event on 14 September 2018, at the University Club of San Francisco, was co-hosted by Oxford Climate Policy, Cool Effect, and 350 Seattle. Leaders, stakeholders, activists, and experts discussed how to advance sub-national action on multilateral climate finance to ensure financial support to developing countries – especially those most vulnerable – despite the Trump Administration cancelling America's promised funding to the Green Climate Fund.

Across the US there is a growing realization that climate change is a serious issue that needs to be tackled. A growing coalition of US sub-nationals – states, cities, corporations, counties, universities, grassroots networks, non-profit organizations, and individuals – have come to see the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by the Trump administration as a reckless act of geo-political vandalism. Thousands have signed pledges to stick to the deal struck in 2015.

But the Paris Agreement is not just about emission reductions. It is equally about providing financial support to developing countries – especially the most vulnerable ones – to help them fight climate change and its adverse impacts. One of the key instruments of the Paris Agreement for this purpose is a number of multilateral funds collectively known as the Agreement's "financial mechanism."

These funds serve as a beacon to developing countries that their plight is recognized and appreciated. This helps to reduce a prevailing sense of injustice, which could scuttle all efforts to coordinate the worldwide carbon cuts necessary to address climate change successfully. Tragically, the Trump administration has decided to discontinue contributions to these funds and also to renege on contractual obligations incurred by the Obama administration, in particular, to contribute an additional \$2 billion to the Green Climate Fund.

The event discussed the need for sub-national action on multilateral climate finance and showcased three ideas of how sub-nationals could contribute to the financial mechanism of the Paris Agreement:

- A Massachusetts-UN Least Developed Countries Fund (MLDCF) would be established under Massachusetts state law by means of a bill written by State Senator Mike Barrett. The bill proposes to add a new “check-off” option to the six options involving other good causes that are already included on Massachusetts state income tax forms for the convenience of taxpayers who wish to make donations over and above their income tax obligations. Contributions to the MLDCF would be relayed to the Least Developed Countries Fund established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The MLDCF would be legally constituted as well to receive other gifts, grants, and donations to the UN Fund.
- The Western Climate Fund is a regional, multi-state instrument proposed by Oxford Climate Policy in collaboration with the Chair of the UNFCCC Least Developed Countries Group to collect resources from a variety of sources — focusing on shares of proceeds of carbon policy instruments (e.g. the sale of emission trading permits, or carbon tax revenue) — centered around, but not limited to, the Canadian Provinces and US States of the Western Climate Initiative, with the aim of collecting funding for the multilateral funds serving the Paris Agreement.
- The U.S. nonprofit organization Cool Effect has launched several successful campaigns to give individuals a way to contribute to the global fight against climate change. #STILLIN is one of the crowdsourcing initiatives in progress. It will allow individuals to pledge US\$ 1 or more toward funding the gap caused by the current administration’s exit from the Paris Agreement. Contributions will be directed toward groups such as the Adaptation Fund with an emphasis of supporting projects that directly help people most effected by climate change.

Following the presentations, a panel of distinguished stakeholders, including the Chair of Least Developed Countries Group in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), discussed the importance of multilateral finance in advancing both mitigation and adaptation ambition.

Innovative Sources for Multilateral Climate Finance

This event was organised by the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB) and ecbi on 8 December 2018 in Katowice, Poland, during COP24. It showcased ideas for innovative, additional contributions to the funds of the UNFCCC Financial Mechanism and mechanisms to enhance their longer-term viability. Facilitated by Marzena Chodor, Co-Chair of the PCCB, the event was targeted at key stakeholders in the field of multilateral climate finance, including finance negotiators, representatives of relevant UNFCCC bodies, international financial institutions, NGOs, as well as independent experts.

Webinar: Highlights from Katowice

A webinar on the outcomes of COP24 in Katowice was organised in Florence, Italy by the [Florence School of Regulation](#) (FSR) at the European University Institute, [Climalia](#) and ecbi on 12 February 2019. Attended by over a 100 participants worldwide, the event was moderated by Simone Borghesi, Director, FSR Climate. Leonardo Massai, Co-founder of Climalia, presented on the Katowice outcomes, while ecbi Director Benito Müller focused on the ambition mechanism of the Paris Agreement and on climate finance. A video recording of the webinar is available [here](#).

From Katowice to Florence: Outcomes of COP24 and Role of Non-State Actors

This seminar, organised by Climalia, ecbi and Italian Climate Network took place at the University of Florence on 13 February 2019. Following opening remarks by Ilaria Perrisi from the University of Florence, Leonardo Massai, Climalia, presented on COP24 main outcomes and the way forward. ecbi Director Benito Müller presented on global ambition and sub-national finance mobilisation. Francesco Capezuoli and Margherita Bellanica, Italian Climate Network, presented on the role of NGOs.

Capacity Building at the Intersection of Women’s Leadership and Gender Equality

This event, jointly organised by the Women’s Environment and Development Group (WEDO) and ecbi from 4-6 March 2019 in Oxford, provided an opportunity for ecbi to further deepen its engagement at the intersection of gender and climate change, and to discuss and formalise future collaboration with WEDO. It was attended by 10 gender and climate change. The first part of the meeting reviewed the training modules used by WEDO and ecbi for new UNFCCC negotiators, to promote cross-learning and identify common challenges, solutions, and areas for collaboration. This was followed by a review of climate and gender policy at the international and national levels, to identify future areas for intervention.

Training and Support Programme

The Training and Support Programme (T&SP) conducted one Pre-COP Training Workshop and three regional workshops, in addition to funding bursaries and producing background papers in 2018.

Regional Training Workshop: Anglophone Africa

The 2018 ecbi Regional Training Workshop for Anglophone Africa took place on 9 & 10 April 2018 in Sali, Senegal. The workshop was organised in collaboration with ecbi’s regional partner Energie Environment Développement (ENDA), was attended by 29 negotiators from the region.

Sessions were held on:

- 2018 UNFCCC Negotiations: Outlining the Year Ahead, led by Bubu Pateh Jallow, a senior negotiator from The Gambia.
- Becoming a Better UNFCCC Delegate: Tips and Tricks led by Stella Gama, a senior negotiator from Malawi.
- Adaptation and the Paris Agreement led by Binyam Gebreyes, IIED.
- Mock negotiations, Chaired by Gama.
- Group scenario position, where participants were asked to form a group position on a given scenario.
- Transparency framework for action and support led by Subhi Barakat, IIED.
- Pre-2020 Action and the Talanoa Dialogue led by Anju Sharma, Oxford Climate Policy.
- Global Stocktake and the Compliance Mechanism, led by Jallow.

A more detailed report can be found [here](#).

Regional Training Workshop: Francophone Africa

The 2018 ecbi Regional Training Workshop for Francophone Africa took place on 12 & 13 April 2018 in Saly, Senegal. The workshop, organised in collaboration with ecbi’s regional partner Energie Environment Développement (ENDA Energie), was attended by 27 negotiators from the region.

The Anglophone Training Workshop was held during the same week as the Francophone workshop in Saly, on 9 & 10 April 2018. This year, the ecbi Anglophone and Francophone Training Workshops for Africa included a “bridging day”, to provide an opportunity to the participants of the two workshops to meet and engage with each other. During a morning session of the bridging day, a speed networking session between the 29 participants of the Anglophone workshop and 27 participants of the Francophone workshop was followed by an exchange of experiences on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs); and a discussion on climate finance.

Sessions were held on:

- Becoming a Better UNFCCC Delegate: Tips and Tricks led by Mamadou Honadia, a senior UNFCCC negotiator from Burkina Faso.
- Outlook for 2018 in the UNFCCC Negotiations led by Gebru Endalew, LDC Group Chair.
- Adaptation and the Paris Agreement led by Binyam Gebreyes, IIED.
- Mock Negotiations, on gender and climate change, with Madeleine Diouf Sarr, Senegal, as Chair.
- Group Scenario Position, chaired by Honadia, where participants were asked to form a group position on a given scenario.
- Transparency framework for action and support, led by Subhi Barakat, IIED.
- Pre-2020 Action and the Talanoa Dialogue, led by Anju Sharma, Oxford Climate Policy.
- Global stocktake and the compliance mechanism, led by Honadia.

During the final session, participant provided their feedback on the workshop. Participants who had attended the training session last year felt the workshop was better this year, and they stood to understand much more given that this was their second chance. A participant said the workshop has helped her with acquiring valuable techniques to take to the negotiations. While she learnt a lot last year, this year allowed for more opportunity to make efforts in overcoming the language barrier. The mock negotiation exercise was very useful which gave the chance to learn from more experienced negotiators.

Another participant said learning both the negotiation techniques and overcoming the language barrier during the mock negotiations was challenging and proposed conducting the negotiations in French for training purposes, or, to explain the methodology in French first. He also proposed inviting more participants per country, say three to four.

Another participant proposed extending the training period, saying two days was too packed to be able to do the mock negotiations justice. He proposed inviting Portuguese-speaking countries, and having more contact with Anglophone countries.

Another participant appreciated the tips from the resource people, saying the presentations on the global stocktake and Talanoa Dialogue, in particular, were very useful.

In closing, Emmanuel Seck said to be a good negotiator and have good negotiator values, self-confidence is important. He called on participants to think of themselves as climate soldiers; be generous in their commitment; come with conviction; be extremely patient and mentally strong; be focused in the choice of themes and areas of interest; and have a strong backbone. He thanked IIED, ecbi and ENDA for their efforts in organising the workshop.

A more detailed report can be found [here](#).

Regional Training Workshop: South and South East Asia

The European Capacity Building Initiative's 2018 South and South East Asia Regional Training Workshop was held on 6 and 7 June in Colombo, Sri Lanka. It was attended by 28 government representatives from 13 countries in the region. The workshop was organised by Janathakshan, in partnership with the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Oxford Climate Policy (OCP), and the Legal Response International (LRI).

During the workshop, sessions were held on:

- Becoming a Better UNFCCC Delegate: Tips and Tricks led by Manjeet Dhakal from Climate Analytics,

Nepal.

- 2018 UNFCCC Negotiations: Outlining the Year Ahead led by Gebru Jember Endalew, Chair of the Least Developed Country (LDC) Group.
- Mock Negotiations on Gender and Climate Change, using the *Pocket Guide on Gender Equality under the UNFCCC* as a resource to learn about the formal and informal procedures in place during COP deliberations.
- Adaptation and the Paris Agreement led by Thinley Namgyel, Chief of the Climate Change Division of the National Environment Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan.
- Talanoa Dialogue and Global Stocktake also led by Manjeet Dhakal.
- Means of Implementation and the Paris Agreement conducted by Anju Sharma, head of the ecbi Publications and Policy Analysis Unit.
- Enhanced Transparency Framework conducted by Pascale Bird, Legal Response International.
- Compliance Mechanism led by Binyam Gebreyes, IIED.

In the final session, participants and organisers exchanged their thanks and shared their thoughts and feedback on the entire workshop. Participants thanked the organisers for providing a very realistic simulation of the negotiations. Some, who had actually attended the negotiations, pointed out that the mock sessions were very well managed and thanked the organisers for the resource material. All the participants urged ecbi to continue the training workshops in future. They also hoped they could attend the next workshop to strengthen the institutional capacity of their respective ministries.

The organisers thanked the participants for their attendance and agreed that developing countries need continued support for negotiations and research. Organisers also cautioned participants against trying to follow all the issues during negotiations – instead, they urged them to find issues and areas that are important and of particular interest to them/ their countries. In conclusion, they reminded participants that climate negotiations are critical because the stakes are very high. Negotiators, especially from the developing world, must work hard to improve their ability to represent their country's interests. They reiterated their commitment to the goal of the training workshops, and to provide a realistic and rewarding experience to create a virtuous cycle of capacity development.

A more detailed report of the training workshop is available [here](#).

Pre-COP Training Workshop

The 2018 ecbi Pre-COP Training Workshop took place on 1 December at the Focus Hotel in Katowice, Poland. The Workshop was attended by almost 30 negotiators from least developing countries (LDCs), who were attending the 24th Conference of Parties (COP24) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In his introductory remarks, Gebru Jember Endalew, LDC Chair, said he started his association with ecbi as a new negotiator more than ten years ago, at an ecbi Regional Training Workshop in Gaborone, Botswana. Since then, he said, ecbi has provided invaluable support during his journey to Chair, and he is always learning from the ecbi process. He shared his own early experiences at the UNFCCC negotiations, and called on the participants to be focused; be aware of Group positions; and support LDC Group thematic coordinators. He expressed his pleasure to see that several relatively new negotiators are already taking on coordination roles, including on the public registry, global stocktake, and compliance. He concluded by thanking ecbi for its role in building the Group's capacity.

Monika Antosik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland, representing the Polish Presidency, said she attended the annual ecbi Oxford Seminar when she started working on the UNFCCC negotiations five years ago, and it was an extremely important experience from which she learnt a lot – including the importance of connecting with other negotiators, to understand their many different perspectives and rationales, to drive compromises and consensus. She said ecbi is extremely crucial for capacity building of European negotiators, and not only of developing country negotiators. She also commended ecbi’s efforts to empower women negotiators in particular.

Addressing the Polish Presidency’s priorities for COP24, Antosik listed agreement on the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP), to ensure a balanced outcome which all Parties can support and defend; and the Talanoa Dialogue. The Pre-COP and bilateral consultations with Parties indicate a strong will to implement the Paris Agreement, she said, but a key challenge is the amount of time available to complete the technical work that remains. She encouraged participants to play their part in closing “non-PAWP” agenda items in the first week, so the second week can focus on the PAWP; and in finding common ground to ensure a successful COP.

Sessions were held on:

- LDC Group priorities for COP24, led by the Chair Endalew.
- Conference agendas, led by Manjeet Dhakal, Climate Analytics
- Climate Diplomacy, the Talanoa Dialogue, and High-Level Events at COP24, led by Dhakal.
- Paris Agreement Work Programme, led by Achala Abeysinghe, IIED.
- Climate finance in Katowice, led by Benito Müller, ecbi.
- Negotiating effectively, led by Ian Fry, Ambassador for Climate Change and Environment, Tuvalu.

A more detailed report can be found [here](#).

Publications and Policy Analysis Unit

During the FY 2018-2019, PPAU produced two thematic Pocket Guides (on loss and damage and NDCs); four policy briefs (on increasing ambition in NDCs, linkages between elements of the Paris Agreement, pre-2020 ambition, and COP24 outcomes); and two versions of a discussion note on common time frames. In addition, three Pocket Guides on transparency, capacity building, and gender were updated, following progress on these issues in the UNFCCC negotiations. Six meeting reports, in addition to the ecbi Annual Report for 2017-2018 were also produced.

Improvements on the ecbi website continued throughout the year, and ecbi improved its social media presence through further use of sites like Twitter and Linkages.

New product

A new PPAU product was launched this year: a summary of COP outcomes after the annual UNFCCC conference, for the ecbi network of (new and senior) negotiators. The *COP24 Outcomes* policy brief was produced in a collaborative manner, and sought comments and inputs from negotiators. The comments and feedback from developing country and European negotiators were included in the final version. The timing of the publication (January 2019, just after the holidays when everyone was looking to understand the outcomes better) and its succinct, brief description of the outcomes was appreciated by many negotiators. It is hoped that this product will be continued and strengthened every year.

Pocket Guides

This year, two thematic Pocket Guides were produced: the *Pocket Guide on NDCs under the UNFCCC*, and the *Pocket Guide on Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC*. In addition, updated 2018 versions were produced of the *Pocket Guide on Transparency under the UNFCCC*; *Pocket Guide on Gender under the UNFCCC*; and *Pocket Guide on Capacity Building under the UNFCCC*, to include progress made on these issues in the previous year. The French versions of Gender and Transparency were also updated: *Édition 2018 du Guide de Poche sur l'Égalité de Genre sous la CCNUCC* and *Édition 2018 du Guide de poche sur la transparence sous la CCNUCC*.

The Pocket Guides continued to be popular with junior and senior negotiators. They are used in the three training workshops organised under the ecbi Training and Support Programme annually, and hard copies were also requested by the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), for their training workshops. In addition, one developed country participant to the ecbi Oxford Seminar and several developing country negotiators said they were being used for in-country training of negotiators. There has also been a request for translation of the NDC and Gender Pocket Guides to Arabic, from UN Environment (discussions are underway on this).

Policy Briefs and Notes

The focus of the policy briefs and notes remained on agreeing a coherent, comprehensive and ambitious Paris rulebook this year, and also, as the deadline approaches, on the pre-2020 process. In addition to the COP24 Outcomes policy brief, ecbi produced four policy briefs and notes: *Pre-2020 Ambition on Climate Change: History, Status, Outlook*; *Piecing the Paris Puzzle: Links and Gaps in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change*; *Common Time Frames: Creating Space for Ambition in the Paris Agreement Rulebook*; and *'Common Time Frames': What & Why? Second Updated Edition*.

The drafts of the policy briefs on linkages and pre-2020 ambition were presented at the ecbi Oxford Seminar, to kick-start discussions and to get feedback. These comments were then taken into account while finalising the policy briefs. The two notes on Common Time Frames were prepared in close consultation with negotiators.

Meeting Reports

PPAU produced the following six meeting reports in addition to the ecbi Annual Report:

- Bonn Seminar 2018 Report
- 2018 Regional Training Workshop for Anglophone Africa
- 2018 Regional Training Workshop for South and Southeast Asia
- Oxford Seminar Report 2018
- 2018 Pre-COP Training Workshop
- 2018 Regional Training Workshop for Francophone Africa

Blogs

Five blogs were produced this year on the Oxford Climate Policy (OCP) blogsite: *We need Geo-engineering . . . of Consumer Aspirations!*; *GCF Board: In need of a cultural revolution!*; *Climate leadership in a historical perspective and lessons for the implementation of the Paris Agreement: Reflections of a former negotiator*; *Addressing the finance gap in sub-national contributions to the fight against climate change*; and *Innovative Sources for Multilateral Climate Finance*.

Website and outreach

Throughout this the year, PPAU worked on improving the ecbi and OCP websites, and streamlining the process of communicating regularly with the ecbi community of negotiators through newsletters and publication updates. In addition to directly mailing publications to the negotiators, they were shared with the broader climate community through the CAN-Talk and Climate-L lists. The Pocket Books were distributed at our regional workshops, as noted earlier, and integrated into the programme during the mock negotiating session, where participants were expected to read them and use them during the negotiations. The gender guide was also disseminated by the Women's Environment & Development Organisation (WEDO). It continues to be one of the top gender resources promoted on the gender section of the UNFCCC website.

Gender Strategy

In previous years, ecbi has monitored mainly the participation of women in its events as a key indicator of its gender strategy. However, this is largely beyond the control of ecbi, as the participants for its Fellowship programme events are either nominated by Chairs of groups from within an existing pool of negotiators, where the numbers of men and women are not balanced; or through a process of self-selection (for instance as in the Bonn Seminar, where participation is open to negotiators from developing countries and Europe. Aware of this limitation, ecbi has sought to improve other elements that are more within its control, such as the quality of the gender content at its events.

Towards this goal, this time the presentation on gender and climate change was made by Bridget Burns, the Director of the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), at the start of the ecbi Oxford Seminar, rather than at the end of the ecbi Oxford Fellowship. It was felt that a discussion on gender is relevant to all countries, not only developing countries; and that a gender presentation at the start should seek to highlight the need to incorporate it as a cross-cutting issue in all other issues considered during the Seminar. Burns addressed a broad range of issues, including the definition of gender; what negotiators should know about gender; the current state of play on gender, in particular in the Lima Work Programme on gender and the Gender Action Plan (GAP); and gender in the Paris rulebook. The discussion at the end was illuminating, as it became apparent that sometimes there is little regard for a balance between women and men even on developed country teams; and also little understanding of the sectoral challenges of taking gender concerns on board in policies and implementation at the national level. Discussions were held on the best way to incorporate gender into sectoral policymaking.

During the 2018 Oxford Seminar, a small meeting was held in the sidelines, to seek advice for ecbi's future work on gender. One of the suggestions was implemented at COP24, where ecbi piloted a mentoring programme for new women negotiators. While one new female negotiator from a developing country was paired with a senior woman negotiator from a developed country, two others were paired with senior developing country negotiators.

As a result of discussions held through the year with WEDO, the two organisations took a first step towards deeper collaboration in the coming year, and during the next phase of ecbi: a three-day meeting on Capacity Building at the Intersection of Women's Leadership and Gender Equality was held in Oxford. This event, jointly organised by the Women's Environment and Development Group (WEDO) and ecbi from 4-6 March 2019 in Oxford, provided an opportunity for ecbi to further deepen its engagement at the intersection of gender and climate change, and to discuss and formalise future collaboration with WEDO. It was attended by 10 gender and climate change. The first part of the meeting reviewed the training modules used by WEDO and ecbi for new UNFCCC negotiators, to promote cross-learning and identify common challenges, solutions, and areas for collaboration. This was followed by a review of climate and gender policy at the international and national

levels, to identify future areas for intervention. A number of new initiatives were identified for possible collaboration between ecbi and WEDO, including a continuation of the mentoring programme, collaboration on training new negotiators including developing common databases and tools for training; and an increased focus on tackling national level challenges in integrating gender into climate related policy making and implementation.

In addition, ecbi Gender Advisor Stella Gama from Malawi has been proactive in helping ecbi develop its gender-related work, particularly as it prepares for the next phase.

Meanwhile, the ecbi Training and Support Programme continues to prioritise the participation of women negotiators in its training workshops, and through its bursary programme. The ecbi bursary programme, managed by the International Institute of Environment and Development (IIED), supported two bursary holders to attend UNFCCC negotiating sessions during the current reporting period: Ms Xaysomphone Souvannavong from Lao People's Democratic Republic and Ms Fatima Athoumani from Comoros. Both have authored blogs on their experience:

- How I learnt to make my voice count at the UN climate negotiations – Xaysomphone Souvannavong
- The sharp learning curve of an LDC negotiator – Fatima Athoumani

Logistical support, as well as technical advice and capacity building were provided to each.

It is hoped that the ecbi focus on training women negotiators, and providing them space for collaboration in the negotiations, will eventually result in more women negotiators participating in its Fellowship events, and of course in the negotiations.